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Operational Risk Management (ORM) has been credited with reducing the 
Navy's mishap rate to all time lows, especially in Naval Aviation.   Through the use of a 
five-step process, ORM has been able to change the decision makers' paradigm of day- 
to-day operations in naval fleet units, making safety the paramount factor that would 
allow fleet commanding officers to conserve their assets, yet meet the requirement to 
train in high-risk environments. ORM is a process that mitigates the risk associated with 
the high-risk environment that naval fleet units operate in. 
Not unlike naval fleet units, our computer networks operate in a high-risk 
environment-the Internet. Crackers are able to penetrate what were thought to be secure 
networks, and copy, modify, disrupt or destroy valuable information. The risk posed to 
the Navy's computer network systems is very great. Given the Navy's adoption of 
"Network-Centric Warfare" and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), the hazards 
faced by the possible compromise of these computer network systems are as great as any 
a fleet unit would encounter in its normal operating environment. 
The objective of this thesis is to translate ORM practices into Information 
Assurance Risk Management (IARM) practices, and demonstrate IARM's utility in 
identifying, quantifying, and mitigating the security risks associated with computer 
networks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
The Navy Marine Corps Intranet mission statement, "To enable the sharing of 
information worldwide with those who need it, when they need it, and to enhance 
enterprise-wide work, training, and quality of life for every Marine, Sailor, and DON 
Civilian," typifies the Department of the Navy's (DON) push towards leveraging the 
capabilities of information technology and the Internet to aid in making the DON a more 
efficient and effective organization. In embarking on the NMCI, the DON has 
acknowledged that the quick and unencumbered exchange of information is an extremely 
important commodity in bringing the DON into the 21st century. The DON has also 
adopted as its new tactical philosophy "Network-Centric Warfare." This new philosophy 
builds on the premise of gaining "knowledge superiority" using high speed and high 
capacity sensors and networks as a tactical advantage over any potential adversaries. 
This enterprise-wide access of information exposes DON networks to much of the same 
risks that are being faced today by commercial companies who use the Internet to 
conduct business to client and business-to-business transactions. 
Two events that clearly illustrate the risks posed to DON and DOD computer 
network systems are the "Moonlight Maze" investigation and the DOD "Eligible 
Receiver" war game. As reported by the Washington Times on 16 April 1998, Eligible 
Receiver was a military exercise that demonstrated how vulnerable military and civilian 
networks are to attack by hackers (Gertz). An NSA "Red Team," posing as "make- 
believe hackers," used software freely available in the Internet to break into unclassified 
military computer networks in Hawaii, the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Command, as 
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well as in Washington, Chicago, St. Louis and parts of Colorado.  The NSA Red Team 
clearly demonstrated their ability to disrupt the command and control capability in the 
Pacific theater.    Also demonstrated were that attacks on the U.S. power grid were 
possible that could have succeeded in bringing it down.   These attacks were possible 
because the Red Team was able to breach the Pentagon's unclassified global computer 
system (NIPRNET) using Internet service providers and dial-in connections that allowed 
them to go from network system to network system, enabling them to hide their true 
locations.   Eligible Receiver was one of the motivating factors in getting the Clinton 
administration to create the Commission on Critical Infrastructure. 
The Moonlight Maze investigation was initiated after it was discovered that a 
series of intrusions into government networks appear to have originated from Russia. In 
testimony before the  Senate Judiciary  Committee's  subcommittee on technology, 
terrorism   and  government  information,   Michael   Vitas,   director  of the  National 
Infrastructure Protection Center, said the intrusions took large amounts of sensitive but 
unclassified (SBU) data, including defense technology research information (Johnston). 
Michael Vitas is further quoted: 
We know that several foreign nations are already developing 
information warfare doctrines, programs and capabilities. They see that 
they cannot defeat the United States in head-to-head military encounter 
and they believe that information operations are a way to strike at what 
they perceive as America's Achilles Heel: our reliance on information 
technology to control critical government and private sector systems. 
Moonlight Maze illustrates that attacks on our computer networks may be as active a part 
of hostilities as the actual use of conventional weapons in future conflicts. 
Eligible Receiver and Moonlight Maze illustrate what can happen when the risks 
to computer network systems are not properly managed.    These risks go largely 
unchecked because of the ignorance towards information assurance in many 
organizations. The Department of Defense (DoD) is a prime example where the lack of 
knowledge about information assurance issues have led to little or no risk management to 
DoD computer networks. Mrs. Chey Cobb, a recently retired 20-year DoD employee, 
made some very pointed observations in this regard. Mrs. Cobb has worked in DoD 
firewall certification and anti-virus testing labs, has been involved with Web security 
since 1994, helped develop DoD and intelligence systems architectures, has served as a 
senior technical security advisor for the Intelligence Community and as a DoD security 
program manager. She cites in a presentation titled "Why Government Systems Fail at 
Security," that many key decision makers are ignorant and unaware of computer network 
security issues. She states that not enough money is spent on system administrator 
training and that many users have poor security habits, like using easy passwords or 
keeping the same password over an extended period of time. She bolsters her argument 
by citing a 1998 General Accounting Office (GAO) survey 
(www, gao.gov/AIndexFY98/categorv/Inform.htm) of security officers: 
- 66% stated didn't have enough time or training to do their jobs. 
-53% stated that security was an ancillary duty. 
-43% were totally unaware of what they should be doing. 
-57% had no security training. 
Mrs. Cobb further states that IT support personnel and security officers rely too much on 
technical tools like firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) as the "cure" for 
computer network security. 
The civilian computer-security community has long since realized security 
hardware and software tools are not the only answer. Alan Paller, director of research for 
the SANS (System Administration and Network Security) Institute in the March 2000 
issue of Government Computer News: 
The dirty little secret of computer security is that tools don't solve 
the problems. The tools provide a false sense of security. The reality of 
what solves the problem is training IT support personnel to systematically 
protect their systems. Because it doesn't matter what kind of hardware 
and software you use, you cannot protect the system if they don't do it 
right. 
The above observations illustrate the need for a more disciplined and methodic approach 
to computer network security that is centered on people. 
A proven, people-focused method to control risks that can be adapted to risks 
associated with network security originated with the United States Army and is called 
Operational Risk Management (ORM). ORM has been credited with reducing the 
Navy's mishap rate to all time lows, especially in Naval Aviation. Through the use of a 
five-step process, ORM has been able to change the decision makers' paradigm of day- 
to-day operations in naval fleet units. Before the use of ORM, unit Commanding 
Officers measured success by meeting mission goals. If mishaps occurred, it was 
attributed to the cost of doing business given the high-risk environment that naval fleet 
units operated in. As the Navy and the military contracted after the break up of the 
Soviet Union, they were forced to conserve their assets due to the high cost of replacing 
resources lost through mishaps and reduced funding availability. Concurrently, the high 
cost of new weapon systems and the considerable investment required in training 
personnel required that the Navy change its priorities in the way it conducted its day-to- 
day operations.   Safety was deemed to be the paramount factor that would allow fleet 
commanding officers to conserve their assets, yet meet the requirement to train in high- 
risk environments. The ORM process changed commanding officers' priorities. Now 
safety was deemed to be the number one priority in training and conducting day-to-day 
operations. ORM was a process that mitigated the risk associated with the high-risk 
environment that naval fleet units operate in and facilitated a paradigm shift that put 
safety at the top of decision makers' priorities. 
Not unlike naval fleet units, our computer networks operate in a high-risk 
environment-the Internet. Crackers are able to penetrate what were thought to be secure 
networks and copy, modify, disrupt or destroy valuable information. A computer virus 
can cause damage to networks through the deletion of data or denial of service. 
Distributed denials of service attacks on target systems through various remotely 
compromised systems are common occurrences. A proliferation of cracker tools is 
available for easy download and use has produced the "script kiddies" widely known 
today. The risk posed to the Navy's computer network systems is very great and is 
exacerbated by user and decision maker ignorance of computer network security. Given 
the Navy's adoption of "Network-Centric Warfare" and the deployment of the Navy- 
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), the hazards faced by the possible compromise of these 
computer network systems are as great as any a fleet unit would encounter in its normal 
operating environment. 
B.        PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The objective of this thesis is to translate ORM practices to Information 
Assurance   Risk  Management  (IARM)   practices,   demonstrate  IARM's   utility   in 
identifying, quantifying, and mitigating the security risks associated with computer 
networks for the Department of the Navy (DON).   Finally, demonstrate that "network 
security" should be elevated to the same level of importance as "safety" in aviation. 
Specific research questions the author sets out to answer are: 
1. Can the ORM process be tailored/modified to fit the security risk associated with 
computers and networks? 
2. Can an Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) process be developed from 
ORM and be used to effectively improve the Computer Network Defense (CND) 
performance on DON network systems? 
3. Can IARM be used to make effective information technology procurement decisions 
in regards to security criteria? 
C.        SCOPE, METHODOLOGY, LIMITS, ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis is limited in its scope. The scope will include: (1) a review of the 
ORM process, (2) an analysis of how ORM can be applied to computer networks, (3) the 
development of CRSM, (4) a demonstration of how IARM can improve CND and thus 
computer network security through out the fleet, and (5) a demonstration of how IARM 
can be applied to the procurement of new IT. Details of how IARM can be specifically 
applied to particular networks and IT systems are left to the organization to best suit their 
particular environment. 
The research methodology used in writing this thesis included a combination of 
methods. Extensive literary research was first performed using the resources listed in the 
bibliography. Additional education on the subject was obtained from attending the 
SANS Network Security 2000 conference, Monterey, CA October 2000.   Previous to 
reporting to the Naval Postgraduate School, the author attended the six-week Aviation 
Safety Officer course, also here at NPS, from August to September 1996. During that 
course the principles of Operational Risk Management (ORM) were taught in a practical 
approach for application in the fleet. The author then applied ORM in an operational 
environment as the Safety Officer for an F-14 squadron from April 1997 to June 1998. 
During that period the squadron performed high-tempo operations from both shipboard 
and land environments. Hands on computer network experience was gained by working 
with the NPS Network Operations staff in understanding the current network architecture 
of the NPS intranet, and from creating a custom research lab that was a mock-up of the 
intranet. This mock-up was then subjected to the installation of different VPN 
technologies, including a TimeStep© 7520 gateway appliance. The author earned a 
Global Incident Analysis Center (GIAC) Security Essentials Certification (GSEC) from 
the SANS Institute in November 2000 and was certified as a Microsoft Systems Certified 
Engineer (MCSE) in December 2000. 
There are certain assumptions the author made in writing this thesis. Though 
there will be an extensive review of key concepts, it is expected that the reader has a 
basic understanding of how networks function. This includes understanding the Internet 
Protocol (IP) and functions of basic network components such as routers and firewalls. 
D.        THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The author has organized this thesis into four chapters. Chapters I is meant as an 
introduction to the concepts that will be covered in greater depth later in the thesis. 
Chapter  II  provides   background   information   for  those   readers  unfamiliar  with 
Operational Risk Management (ORM). Chapter IE contains the heart of the thesis, 
discussing how Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) can be developed 
from ORM, and how it can have a positive, qualitative impact on Computer Network 
Defense (CND). It is here that IARM will be developed and applied to CND and the 
development of IT systems. Chapter IV encompasses the author's recommendations on 
actually implementing Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) in the DON. It 
also discusses conclusions and possible areas for further research. 
IL        OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) 
A.       MOTIVATION BEHIND ORM 
Navy units, especially those associated with carrier aviation, operate in some of 
the most hazardous operational environments known. Flying aircraft, both high- 
performance jets and helicopters, from ships is a very high-risk endeavor. An unwanted, 
but inevitable result has been many mishaps to equipment and personnel. Figure 1 shows 
the different programs that have been instituted in Naval Aviation in an attempt to reduce 
the mishap rate. The figure shows the trend for the mishap rate decreasing as a result of 
systematic changes applied to equipment and procedures designed to manage risk. 
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Figure 2-1. Naval Aviation Mishap Rate (From U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
These programs, which were successful attempts of assessing risks and implementing 
controls, are viewed largely as reactive in nature because they corrected known 
deficiencies in equipment reliability and operating procedures after being identified in an 
operational environment. Though the beneficial result has been a decline in the mishap 
rate, it has leveled off. Conventional risk management of equipment reliability and 
standard operational procedures has been largely optimized. Though the benefits of this 
approach remain, we have reached a point of diminishing returns. 
While the mishap rate did decline, the overall monetary costs associated with 
these mishaps did not. Due to the technical complexity of today's equipment, the cost of 
aircraft and personnel training has increased significantly, as has the cost associated with 
each mishap. From FY-95 to 99, aviation related mishaps have cost the Navy $3.3 
billion. (Naval Safety Center) In the fiscal environment of the nineties, where the 
military was undergoing a significant downsizing, losses due to mishaps were viewed as 
having an adverse effect on readiness. The focus of risk management had to be re- 
orientated to those factors still causing mishaps - human error. Figure 2-2 depicts the 
annual frequency of mishaps with a monetary value of $10,000 or more attributable, at 
least in part, to human error, and those solely attributed to mechanical failures, between 
1977 and 1992. The chart shows that while the mishaps attributed to mechanical error 
declined to about 1 in every 100,000 flight hours, those attributed to human error has not 
kept pace and only declined to about 7 in every 100,000 flight hours. (NSC) 
Furthermore, of all Navy and Marine Corps aviation mishaps from FY 90 to 96 that 





Figure 2-2. All Navy-Marine Corps Mishaps, CY 1977-92 (From U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
monetary loss of $1 million or more, over 80% was determined to have human error as a 
causal factor. (NSC) The answer, as will be discussed below, to reducing the mishaps 
caused by human error was a new form of risk management - Operational Risk 
Management (ORM). 
B.        THE ORM PROCESS - INTRODUCTION 
Operational Risk Management originated in the U.S. Army when it was adopted 
in the late 1980s as a process to improve safety among its ranks. In its most fundamental 
form, ORM does not aim to eliminate risk, but to manage risk so that the mission can be 
accomplished with the minimum amount of loss due to accidents. It is presented as a 
standardized tool to aid people working in a high-risk environment to pro-actively 
prevent mishaps. People make decisions based on what they perceive to be important to 
accomplishing their purpose in life.  Through a five-step process, ORM seeks to change 
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the way people perceive risk in their environment by providing the best baseline of 
knowledge and experience available in which to make informed decisions. ORM 
minimizes risks to acceptable levels by systematically applying controls to each risk that 
is not acceptable. It seeks to change cultural attitudes towards risk taking by making 
accident prevention the primary consideration when making decisions. Consequently, 
ORM is not just applicable to the high-risk environment of Naval Aviation, but to every 
environment where the risk of equipment loss or personal injury is present. The Navy's 
intention is to promote ORM as a process, even a way of life, not a program, and make it 
applicable to each individual's way of thinking. 
C.       ORM TERMS 
The following are terms as applied to ORM in an operational environment. They 
are present here to facilitate a more in-depth discussion on the five-step ORM process 
later. 
1. Hazard 
A condition with the potential to cause personal injury or death, property damage, 
or mission degradation. Examples include enemy threats, security threats, inefficient use 
of assets, something, which can damage the organization's image and credibility, etc. 
2. Risk 
An expression of possible loss in terms of severity and probability. 
3. Severity 
The worst, credible consequence that can occur as a result of a hazard. It is the 
potential degree of loss.   It is an expression of how serious the injury or illness, how 
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much equipment damage, how much lost time, money, man-hours or credibility could be 
experienced as a result of the hazard. 
4.        Probability 
The likelihood that a hazard will result in a mishap or loss, or cause a mission 
degradation. Based on factors such as location, exposure, personnel, experience and 
historical information. 
Risk Assessment 
Code - ( RAC ) 
1 = Critical 
2 = Serious 
3 = Moderate 
4 = Minor 
5 = Negligible 
CAT I = Death/ Loss of 
asset. 
CAT II = Severe injury / 
degradation of 
asset 
CAT 111= Minor injury/ 
degradation of 
asset. 
CAT IV= Minimal injury/ 
degradation of 
asset. 



















Cat I 1 1 2 3 
Cat II 1 2 3 
4 
Cat III 2 3 4 5 
Catrv 3 4 5 5 
Risk Levels 
Risk Assessment Code 
Figure 2-3. Risk Assessment Code Chart (From U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
5.        Risk Assessment 
The process of detecting hazards and assessing the associated risk. It is the first 
two steps of the ORM process. The result is a risk assessment code (RAC) derived from 
the chart in figure 2-3. 
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6. Controls 
A method for reducing risk for an identified hazard by lowering the probability of 
occurrence, decreasing potential severity, or both. 
7. Operational Risk Management 
The process of dealing with risk associated with military operations, which 
includes risk assessment, risk decision-making, and implementation of effective risk 
controls. 
D.       THE ORM PROCESS 
The operational risk management process is a simple five-step process. It is a 
continuous process designed to detect, assess, and control risk while enhancing 
performance and maximizing capabilities. It was adapted from the concept of applying a 
standard, systematic approach to minimizing risk that was originally developed to 
improve safety in the development of weapons, aircraft, space vehicles, and nuclear 
power. The five steps are: 
1. Identify Hazards 
Identify potential causes of injury, damage or mission degradation. Specific 
actions include a mission/task analysis, listing hazards and listing causes for those 
hazards. 
2. Assess Hazards 
For each hazard identified, determine the associated risk in terms of severity and 
probability. Specific actions include assessing the exposure, severity and probability to 
the hazards listed in step 1. 
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3. Make Risk Decisions 
Develop risk control options, and then decide if benefits outweigh risks. Seek 
further controls or guidance from superiors if necessary. Specific actions include 
identifying control options, determining the effects of those controls, prioritizing risk 
control measures, selecting risk controls and making risk decisions. 
4. Implement Controls 
Once the risk decisions are made, implement selected controls. Specific actions 
include making implementation of the above controls clear, establish accountability, and 
provide support. 
5. Supervise 
Follow-up to ensure controls are working and watch for changes. Specific actions 
include supervising the control implementation, monitoring for effectiveness, collecting 
feedback on the controls and monitoring for change. The summary of specific actions 
associated with each step of the ORM process is listed below in figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-4. The Cyclic ORM Process (After U.S. Air Force ORM Process) 
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E.        CAUSES OF RISK 
A discussion of some of the factors that cause risk is useful. It facilitates a more 
thorough understanding of how hazards develop in our every day activities and how 
people using ORM to control risks associated with those hazards can be more effective in 
identifying them. 
1. Change 
In almost every environment, change is typically known as the "Mother" of all 
risk. The majority of people do not react favorably to change, especially when it's 
abrupt. Changes should alert us to new hazards and increased risk. 
2. Resource Constraints 
In the last decade, the military has had to operate under the motto of "doing more 
with less," stretching to the limits the resources it has available to perform its mission. 
An undesirable consequence is that it adds risk to one's environment due to the inability 
to answer the question, "how long can we keep stretching our resources?" 
3. New Technology 
Though new technology can improve reliability and reduce risk, particularly 
second-generation implementations, the gains are often offset by our human abilities to 
absorb all the new information it provides, or adapt to the new equipment. 
4. Complexity 
The more complex the problem, the more riskier. There are more ways for things 
to go wrong. 
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5. Stress 
As pointed out above, human error has been cited in over 80% of aviation 
mishaps for FY-90 to 96. Stress significantly affects the abilities of humans to perform in 
risky environments. 
6. Human Nature 
It is our nature to make mistakes, mis-communicate, have personality conflicts, 
get fatigued, get complacent, and so on. Human nature must be taken into account for the 
inherent risks it introduces in our day-to-day activities. 
7. Inexperience 
Rapid personnel turn over significantly degrades our ability to build corporate 
knowledge at the organization level. 
8. High Energy Levels 
Nervous energy, excitement associated with new situations and perceived 
pressure to perform can all increase risk. A study of Naval Air Force Atlantic and Pacific 
Fleet accidents shows that 56% of the deployment mishaps from FY-91 to first quarter 
FY-96 occurred during the first two months of an extended deployment. 
9. Societal Constraints 
Society's standards and expectations drive public opinion, which has an important 
bearing on military budgets. Events that negatively affect an organization's image in the 
public eye can certainly present risk. The after math of the Vietnam War is a classic 
example. 
10. Environmental Influences 
The physical environment is always a significant consideration. The likelihood of 
natural disasters and extremes of weather always pose a risk to equipment and personnel. 
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11.      Speed/Tempo of Operation 
Risk can increase when the tempo for an organization is unusually high, or when 
it is unusually low, due to complacency. 
F.        THE FOUR ORM PRINCIPLES 
These principles are indispensable to understanding how ORM improves the way 
people make decisions about risk. They govern all actions associated with risk 
management. These principles are applicable before, during, and after all tasks and 
operations. 
1. Accept No Unnecessary Risk 
Unnecessary risk comes without a commensurate return in terms of real benefits 
or available opportunities. All military missions, tasks and our daily routines involve 
risk. The most logical choices for accomplishing a mission or task are those that meet all 
mission/task requirements with the minimum acceptable risk. The corollary to this axiom 
is "accept necessary risk" required to successfully complete the mission or task. 
2. Make Risk Decisions at the Appropriate Level 
Making risk decisions at the appropriate level establishes clear accountability. 
Those accountable for the success or failure of the task must be included in the risk 
decision process. The appropriate level for risk decisions is the one that can allocate the 
resources to reduce the risk or eliminate the hazard and implement controls. Typically, 
the commander, leader, or individual responsible for executing the mission or task is: 
a. Authorized to accept levels of risk typical of the planned operation/task 
(i.e., loss of mission effectiveness, normal wear and tear on materiel). 
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b. Required to elevate decisions to the next level in the chain of command 
after it is determined that controls available to him/her will not reduce residual risk to an 
acceptable level. 
3. Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Costs 
All identified benefits should be compared to all identified costs. The process of 
weighing risks against opportunities and benefits helps to maximize organizational 
capability. Even high-risk endeavors may be undertaken when there is clear knowledge 
that the sum of the benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. Balancing costs and benefits 
may be a subjective process and open to interpretation. Ultimately, the balance may have 
to be determined by the appropriate decision maker. 
4. Anticipate and Manage Risk by Planning 
Risks are more easily assessed and managed in the planning stages of an 
operation/task. Integrating risk management into planning as early as possible provides 
the decision maker the greatest opportunity to apply ORM principles. Additionally, 
feedback must be provided to benefit future missions/activities. 
G.       ORM VS. TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
Although the five steps of ORM are a lot like the decision-making process that 
good leaders have always used, applying a standard process is different in some 
important ways. 
- ORM is more systematic. Frequently, hazard identification and assessment is 
random, and highly dependent upon an individual's past experience and organizational 
skills. ORM provides organized common sense and requires the operators) to focus on 
one piece of the puzzle at a time, completing each step before moving on to the next. 
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- ORM is more proactive. It requires an attempt to identify ALL hazards, not just 
the things that have happened in the past. 
- ORM addresses all types of risk that could threaten our ability to accomplish the 
mission/task during the planning process (security, readiness, communications, enemy 
threats, fiscal limitations, credibility, health, personal safety, equipment failures, etc.) 
This allows effective prioritization of risks, which helps focus limited time/assets on the 
most important issues, rather than addressing safety threats as an after-thought, once the 
plan has been formulated. 
- ORM enhances communication about risk by providing a common process and 
set of terms. It provides a means to articulate concerns and justify decisions. 
Figure 2-5 summarizes the differences in the two approaches. 
ORM vs.             Traditional Approach 
Systematic/Organized Random, Individual-Dependent 
Common Sense 
Proactive Reactive 
Integrates AH Types of Safety as After-thought Once Plan is Done 
Risk Into Plan 
Common Process/Terms Non-standard 
Conscious Decision Based on                     "Can Do" Regardless of Risk 
Risk vs. Benefit 
Figure 2-5. ORM vs. Traditional Approach (From U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
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H.        THE BENEFITS OF ORM 
The U.S. Military has already garnered significant gains in terms of conserving 
assets and preventing injury to personnel. The following are some examples as cited by 
the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps School of Aviation Safety. 
-Aviation Army's class A aircraft mishap rate was 0.64 in FY96, down 83% from 
their FY91 rates, and lower than any other service. The Army also demonstrated a 64% 
reduction in casualties during battalion training cycles, using risk management. 
-In June 96, Navy Reserve Airwing CVWR-20 completed a highly successful 
embarkation on board the USS JOHN C. STENNIS (first time the entire wing embarked 
together in 6 years), including 3 days of cyclic night and day flight ops, with only two 
minor injuries (no lost work days). 
- Marine Air Group MAG-13 has pioneered the use of a MacDonnell Douglas 
computer program which calculates risk of flights based on many factors, to include 
flight time, time of day, currency and proficiency in particular flight tasks, human factors, 
mission difficulty, etc. 
- The USS GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle group also used ORM extensively 
during their very successful 1996 deployment. In addition to using a planning cell to 
look ahead 5 days and begin assessing the risks for upcoming operations, they 
encouraged identification of hazards by sister ships whenever they were along side. 
(Similar to the safety survey concept, hazards are sometimes more visible to an outsider 
than to those inside the organization.) 
- Commander, Second Fleet began using ORM to evaluate and prioritize 
contingency-operation actions (COAs) based on operational mission hazards during their 
planning/execution for JTFX 97-2. Threats to the campaign exercise such as things that 
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could cause combat casualties, loss of time, position or will of the forces to fight, etc. are 
evaluated using ORM, helping the staff to focus on the most important threats. They also 
are using a "benefit analysis" matrix like the risk assessment matrix to help them assess 
the benefits of particular CO As and weigh risk versus benefit. 
- The leadership to Training Wings TRW-1 and TRW-6 met at Meridian with 
members of the NAVAIR and Test Pilot School teams to evaluate recent T-2 aircraft 
performance. During the course of the meetings they conducted a thorough risk 
assessment of returning the T-2 to flight status. The risk assessment included a complete 
review of past flight control anomalies, results of engineering investigations and a 
description of proposed aircraft modifications. The end result of the meeting was a 
measured three-phase approach to the resumption of T-2 flight operations. 
- The USS NEVflTZ Battle Group received ORM training approximately four 
months before conducting a 72-hour continuous flight operations exercise. They utilized 
the ORM process heavily in their planning for the July 1997 exercise. The exercise was 
completed with no material losses and two minor injuries. 
I. ORM LEVELS OF APPLICATION 
The amount of time and level of detail involved in the five steps of ORM varies, 
depending upon the circumstances. 
1.        Time-Critical 
ORM entails a quick, mental review or discussion using five steps during the 
execution phase of operations/training and for crisis response planning. 
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2.        Deliberate 
ORM is a slightly expanded, more detailed application of the five steps in 
planning for an operation or reviewing procedures. This process level is used when there 
is a good understanding of the issues based on experience. The following list of ORM 
steps apply: 
(1) Identify Hazards 
(a) Operation Analysis - a list or chart of the operation's major steps. 
(b) Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) - a list of hazards and 
associated causes for each step of the operation analysis. 
(i) List negative consequences 
(ii) List vulnerabilities 
(iii) List possible causes 
(2) Assess Hazards - prioritize identified hazards by severity and 
probability. Figure 2-3, Risk Assessment Code Chart, can be used to 
facilitate this. 
(3) Make Risk Decisions 
(a) Consider Risk Control Options 
(i) Most Serious Risks First 
(ii) Refer to PHA Causes 
(b) Conduct a Risk vs. Benefit Analysis 
(c) Communicate as Required - If risks still out weigh benefits or 
additional resources are needed to implement selected controls, 
communicate this up the chain of command. 
(4) Implement Controls 
(5) Supervise 
3. In-Depth 
The five-step process for in-depth ORM is basically the same as that or the 
deliberate process, except that a more thorough risk assessment (first two of the five 
steps) is conducted, and a training realism assessment can be added if applicable. Some 
of the details of this level follow. 
a.        Risk Assessment 
This risk assessment could involve research of available data, use of 
diagram and analysis tools, formal testing or long term tracking of the hazards associated 
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with the operations. Examples of in-depth ORM applications include long-term planning 
of complex operations, introduction of new equipment, materials and missions, 
development of tactics and training curricula and major system overhaul or repair. 
There are also a variety of in-depth hazard analysis tools that can be used. 
While a detailed discussion of each of these techniques is outside the scope of this thesis, 
they are listed to demonstrate the flexibility of the ORM process. They include: 
- Analysis of Data 
-Cause and Effect Diagram 
-Tree Diagrams 
-Surveys 
-Simultaneously Timed Event Plotting (STEP) 
-Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
-Interface Analysis 
-Mapping 
-Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis 
b. Training Realism Assessment 
The idea behind the Training Realism Assessment is to minimize the 
differences between training and actual combat procedures. It is based on the fact that a 
risk control that reduces training realism may increase risk to personnel and the mission 
in an actual combat situation. 
The method: 
1. Identify each control/procedure that is different from actual combat 
procedures. 
2. Challenge each one to determine why it is different. 
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3. If the difference is valid (because of safety, resources, time, etc.), 
determine whether or not it has an undesired impact on training realism. Make 
adjustments to reduce undesired impact and identify any non-combat risk controls as 
"training only". 
How we fight   ►.**  How we train 
Differences 
I 
Challenge and Validate 
Not Needed - remove 
No Impact Undesired Impact 
Ignore 
Fix Can't Fix- 
Risk Decision 
Figure 2-6. Training Realism Assessment (From U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
Figure 2-6 depicts the Training Realism Assessment process, and can be 
used as a job aid to conduct the assessment. 
If a risk control is needed, but it is not consistent with combat procedures, 
we must determine if there is a way to modify the control so that it can be used 
effectively in combat. A good example is the requirement for a safety observer. A 
separate safety observer often used in training will not be available in combat. However, 
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we might be able to transfer the risk control functions of the safety observer to personnel 
in the chain of command to achieve an acceptable level of risk while eliminating the 
unrealistic aspect of the training. These risk control functions would then be in effect 
during both combat and training. 
If the separate safety observer is necessary due to the level of risk and 
experience of the personnel involved, the unrealistic effects of having an observer might 
be reduced by placing the observer in a less visible position from which he could check 
and control, but not interfere with the operation. 
Finally, if the control is required for training, and its adverse impact 
cannot be reduced, we must at least ensure the trainees recognize that it is for "training 
only." 
J.        ORM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE U.S. NAVY 
The Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3500.39 is the guiding 
policy for implementation of ORM throughout the fleet. It has directed the following: 
- All unit Commanding Officers should ensure that ORM is implemented into all 
levels of their commands. 
- Train all personnel in the ORM process 
- Incorporate identified hazards, assessments and controls into briefs, notices, and 
written plans. 
-Conduct thorough risk assessments for all new or complex evolutions, defining 
acceptable risk and possible contingencies for the evolution. 
The original concept of adapting ORM for use by the Navy was motivated by the 
need to improve safety in the high-risk environment of Naval Aviation.  Therefore, that 
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Community has taken the lead in the practical implementation of ORM throughout the 
fleet through a three-phased approach. To Summarize: 
-Phase I is the "Jump Start for Operational Units" that introduces ORM training 
into the fleet by getting senior naval aviation leadership knowledgeable about ORM, 
educating squadron leadership and assist squadrons in implementing it as quickly as 
possible. To facilitate this the Naval Safety Center has initiated Advanced ORM/Train- 
the-Trainer courses. 
-Phase II starts the cradle to grave training philosophy by implementing it in the 
training command and undergraduate pilot training. The goal will be perpetual training 
required to keep ORM skills current in the fleet. It implements the cradle to grave 
philosophy by expanding fleet training to include participation by the Naval Aviation 
Training Command (NATRACOM). It starts with first educating Aviation Preflight 
Indoctrination (API) and training squadron instructors, followed by implementing ORM 
in the training squadrons themselves thus educating API and flight training students. 
-Phase III expands ORM training into the all-persuasive Leadership continuum as 
well as enlisted maintenance training. ORM is an essential leadership tool for the entire 
Naval service; therefore, the proper place for the training to reside is in the Leadership 
Continuum where it will be taught at every level from E-5 to Prospective Commanding 
Officer (PCO). 
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m.      INFORMATION ASSURANCE RISK MANAGEMENT (IARM) 
A.        THE NEED FOR IARM 
There is opportunity to apply ORM principles to computer network security. The 
environment our computer networks operate in is full of hazards. Moonlight Maze, 
Operation "Eligible Receiver," the Melissa and "I Love You" viruses, and the distributed 
denial of service (DDOS) attacks performed on major web sites such as Yahoo and E-bay 
are ready examples. The DON has many computer networks, both ashore and at sea. 
While there is an accreditation process mandated by the Defense Information Technology 
Security Certification and Accreditation Program (DITSCAP), there are no standardized 
methods for senior decision makers, network administrators and users of these systems to 
make informed decisions concerning the risks these hazards pose up to or between 
accreditations. John Gilligan, chief information officer (CIO) at the Energy Department 
and co-chair of the CIO Council's committee on security, privacy and critical 
infrastructure has characterized the distributed client-server environment as more difficult 
to manage effectively, saying, "This is not a technical issue. It is a cultural issue at root." 
(Jackson) 
ORM has demonstrated itself as a systematic way to proactively attempt to 
identify all hazards present in a given environment, not just those identified in the past. It 
addresses all types of risk that can have an adverse impact to the task at hand in the 
planning process. ORM enhances communications about risk, provides a common set Of 
terms, and facilitates a means to articulate concerns and justify decisions made. The final 
result is a conscious decision to accept or reject the assessed risk based on the potential 
cost and benefit to the overall task. ORM can be applied anywhere. As the former Chief 
29 
of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jay Johnson put it: "ORM applies across the entire 
spectrum of naval activities, from joint operations and fleet exercises to daily routine. 
We must encourage top down interest in the ORM process, from the flag level all the way 
to the deckplates." 
B.       THE IARM PROCESS - INTRODUCTION 
IARM does not aim to eliminate the security risk inherent in information systems, 
nor computer networks in particular, but to facilitate a process by which those risk can be 
managed to minimize their adverse affects on the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information on computer network systems. As in ORM, it is presented as 
a standardized tool to aid users, IT support personnel and senior decision makers to pro- 
actively prevent security lapses. IARM adapts the five-step process of ORM in order to 
change people's perception of security risk in their information systems' environment by 
providing the best baseline of knowledge and experience available in which to make 
informed decisions. IARM minimizes security risks to acceptable levels by 
systematically applying controls to each risk that is not acceptable. It seeks to change 
cultural attitudes toward managing risk in a computer network environment by making 
information assurance the primary consideration when making decisions. 
A useful illustration of how IARM approaches security differently is made by 
examining the approach the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is taking. The NMCI is 
a large contract entailing the massive outsourcing of the DON's end-to-end information 
services requirements. The Program Executive Office Information Technology (PEO-IT) 
who is managing the NMCI contract acknowledges that along with increasing network 
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Connectivity, the potential for information warfare (IW) attacks also increases.   The 
NMCI information fact file at http://peo-it.naw.mil/documents/nmci securitv.pdfstat.es- 
To counter these threats, the DON will deploy an effective strategy 
(security architectures, policies, procedures and tactics) of aggressive 
active computer network defense within the NMCI structure. 
While perfect security in an information-sharing environment is nearly 
impossible, the NMCI will do much to minimize system vulnerabilities 
and counter potential threats. To this end, the DON has defined a Defense 
in Depth strategy that uses currently available protection technology, 
installed in a layered system of defenses...    (emphasis by author) 
The active computer network defense concept is illustrated in figure 3-1 below 
and is somewhat similar to IARM concepts. 
While it is comforting to read that an "aggressive active computer network 
defense" will be pursued, the author's healthy skepticism leads him to believe that the 
vast majority of that defense will be technology based, possibly at the expense of user 
and decision maker training. An examination of the NMCI Service Level Agreements 
(SLA) concerning information assurance services makes no mention of security training. 
There is a separate SLA that addresses user training and indicates that 8 hours per year 
per user of information security training will be provided. The details of this training are 
unknown to the author. It is the author's opinion that if this training is offered in a 
"general-military training" (GMT) fashion, it will be difficult to tailor it to the three 
specific groups that are the major stake holders in the NMCI, users, DON IT support 
personnel, and DON decision makers. 
The information security fact file cited above states "that only authorized 
Department of Defense (DoD) personnel will perform critical security roles." The author 
contends that user, IT support personnel, and decision maker security awareness, both 
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military and contractor, is one of those critical roles. Implementing the IARM process 
and the recommendations above could be used to facilitate strengthening the human 
factors aspect of an active Computer Network Defense (CND). 
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Active Computer Network Defense: 
Both Developers and Operators are Critical Players 
Recover & Revise 
















Standard Security Architectures, Products, and 
Implementation 
Enable DON Defenses to Act as an INTEGRATED System 
for 
Active Computer Network Defense. 
?i 
[£ 
Figure 3-1. NMCI Active Computer Network Defense Concept (From SPAWAR Naval 
Intranet Concept Brief, Version 2, 30 May 1999) 
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C.       IARM TERMS 
The following are terms used in IARM in a computer network environment. They 
are presented to facilitate a more in-depth discussion on the five-step IARM process later 
in the terms of information assurance (I A). 
1. Confidentiality 
A security service used to provide assurance that information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized persons, processes, or devices. (CIAO, p.53) 
2. Integrity 
A security service that ensures an information system (IS) operates without 
unauthorized modification, alteration, impairment, or destruction of any of its 
components. (CIAO, p.55) 
3. Authentication 
A security service or measure designed to establish the validity of a transmission, 
message, or originator; or as a means of verifying a user's authorization to access specific 
types of information. (CIAO, p.51) 
4. Non-repudiation 
A security service that prevents either a sender or receiver of transmitted data 
from legally denying its transmission or reception. (Stallings, p. 10) 
5. Availability 
A security service that ensures timely and reliable access to data and information 
services for authorized users. (CIAO, p.51) 
6. Access Control 
A security service that limits and controls the access to information system (IS) 
resources to authorized users, programs, processes, or other systems. (CIAO, p.51) 
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7. Exposure 
A form of possible loss or harm in a computing system (e.g., loss of one of the 
services defined above). (Pfleeger, p.3) 
8. Vulnerability 
A flaw in security procedures, software, internal systems controls, or 
implementation of an IS that may cause any of the security services (i.e., those services 
defined above) to be degraded or defeated. Vulnerabilities include flaws that may be 
deliberately exploited and those that may cause failure due to inadvertent human actions 
or natural disasters. (CIAO, p.59) 
9. Threat 
Any circumstance or event that could harm a critical asset through unauthorized 
access, compromise of data integrity, denial or disruption of service or physical 
destruction or impairment. (CIAO, p. 5 8) Any attack that takes advantage of a 
vulnerability (buffer overflow, social engineering, spoofing, eavesdropping, etc.). 
10. Risk 
An expression of possible data or information loss or compromise in terms of 
severity and probability. 
11. Severity 
The worst, credible consequence that can occur as a result of a vulnerability. It is 
the potential degree of data or information loss or compromise. 
12. Probability 
The likelihood that a vulnerability will result in data loss or compromise based on 
factors  such as physical  location,  network  services  provided,  network protocols, 
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operating systems, personnel, and historical information. An expression of the possibility 
of a successful exploitation. 
13. Risk Assessment 
The process of detecting vulnerabilities and assessing associated risk. It is the 
first two steps of the IARM process. The result can be a risk assessment code (RAC) 
derived from the chart in figure 3-2. 
14. Control 
A method for reducing risk for an identified vulnerability by lowering the 
probability of occurrence, decreasing potential severity, or both. 
15. Information Systems 
All the electronic and human components involved in the collection, processing, 
storage, transmission, display, dissemination, and disposition of information. An IS may 
be automated (e.g., a computerized information system) or manual (e.g., a library's card 
catalog). (CIAO, p. 5 5) 
16. Information Operations 
Actions taken to affect an adversary's information and information systems while 
defending one's own information and information systems. (CIAO, p.54) 
17. Information Assurance 
Information operations that protect and defend information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non- 
repudiation. 
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18.      Information Assurance Risk Management 
The process of dealing with risk to information and data that is inherently 
associated with information operations and information systems, which includes risk 
assessment, risk decision-making, and implementation of effective risk controls. 
D.       CAUSES OF RISK IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY 
A discussion of some of the threats and vulnerabilities that make using 
information systems a risky endeavor is useful. It facilitates a more thorough 
understanding of how threats are ever present in computer network and other 
environments, and how users and IT support personnel using IARM to control risks 
associated with those threats can be more effective in identifying them. 
1.        Threats 
Threats can be categorized by associating them with the function that a computer 
network system provides, an uninterrupted flow of information. (Stallings, p.7) Figure 3- 
2 depicts the threats discussed below. 
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Info Source Info Destination 
(a) Normal flow 
(b) Interruption (c) Interception 
(d) Modification (e) Fabrication 
Figure 3-2. Security Threats (From Stallings, p. 7) 
a. Interruption - Commonly known as a denial of service (DOS), this 
threat is an attack on availability. Examples include cutting a communication line, 
destruction of hardware, "smurf' and "syn flood" attacks, distributed denial of service 
attacks (DDOS), jamming and viruses that destroy data on hard drives. 
b. Interception - Commonly known as sniffing, this threat is an attack on 
confidentiality. Examples include keyboard loggers, network sniffers, traffic analysis 
(TF), traffic flow analysis (TFA), and the unauthorized copying of data. 
c. Modification - Commonly known as the "man-in-the-middle," this 
threat is an attack on integrity.  Examples include altering data files through the use of 
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Trojan  horse programs,  replay  attacks  and  altering  contents  of messages  being 
transmitted. 
d. Fabrication - Commonly known as "masquerading," this threat is an 
attack on authenticity. Examples include impersonating legitimate users through the use 
of "back door" programs to gain access to host computers, the installation of "root" kits, 
adding spurious messages to a network, or records to a file. 
e. Social Engineering - A threat not directly depicted in the figure above, 
but is worthy of discussion. This threat does not attempt to exploit the technology of a 
network, but the people who interact with it. Social Engineering is the term used to 
describe an attempt to manipulate or trick a person into providing valuable information or 
access to that information. It attempts to take advantage of people's desire to be helpful. 
A possible example could be someone identifying themselves as a senior officer over the 
phone to their command and asking the password to their account be changed because 
they are on travel. A very junior person might be duped into performing the requested 
action. Social engineering can be computer based as well. Consider a user on a 
computer who suddenly sees a message that their connection to the network has timed out 
and they need to log back in. This method has been used in the past to collect passwords. 
(Cole, p. 1-11) 
Eric Cole, an instructor with the SANS institute, describes this to be one 
of the most difficult attacks to defend against. There is no technology available today 
that can keep a person from unwittingly divulging information. The best defense is 
clearly written security policies and educating users about this and different threats. 
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2. Vulnerabilities 
Scrambay, McClure, and Kurtz list the "Top 14 Security Vulnerabilities" in their 
very popular book, Hacking Exposed: Second Edition, (p. 662) They are listed below: 
a. Inadequate router access control: Misconfigured router access control 
lists (ACLs) can allow information leakage through ICMP, IP, NetBIOS, and lead to 
unauthorized access on your DMZ servers. 
b. Unsecured and unmonitored remote access points provide one of the 
easiest means of access to your corporate network. Telecommuters often connect to the 
Internet with little protection, exposing sensitive files to attack. 
c. Excessive trust relationships such as NT Domain Trusts and Unix .rhost 
and hosts.equiv files can provide attackers with unauthorized access to sensitive systems. 
d. User or test accounts with excessive privileges. 
e. Software that is unpatched, outdated, vulnerable, or left in default 
configurations. 
f. Hosts running unnecessary services (such as RPC, FTP, DNS, SMTP) 
are easily compromised. 
g. Excessive file and directory access controls (NT shares, UNIX NFS 
exports). 
h. Unauthorized services like X Windows allow users to capture remote 
keystrokes. 
i. Weak, easily guessed, and reused passwords at the workstation level 
can doom your servers to compromise. 
j. Misconfigured Internet servers, especially CGI scripts on web servers 
and anonymous FTP. 
k. Misconfigured firewall or router ACL can allow access to internal 
systems directly or once a DMZ server is compromised. 
1. Lack of accepted and well-promulgated security policies, procedures 
and guidelines. 
m. Information leakage can provide the attacker with operating system 
and application versions, users, groups, shares, DNS information via zone transfers, and 
running services like SNMP, telnet, rusers, rpcinfo, NetBIOS. 
n. Inadequate logging, monitoring, and detection capabilities at the 
network and hosts level. 
The SANS Institute maintains a continually updated list on what industry, 
government  and  academia  consider  to  be  the  top-ten,   current  vulnerabilities  at 
http://www.sans.org/topten.html.    Worth noting is that this web site refers to each 
vulnerability by its CVE or CAN number as assigned by http://cve.mitre.org.   This 
facilitates a common terminology in discussing the details of a new exploit. Finally, and 
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most importantly, the SANS site also contains links to vendors that offer software patches 
to combat these exploits. 
It is interesting to note that the above includes non-technical issues that can apply 
to all types of information systems. The above lists are also an insight to the impressive 
number of vulnerabilities and exploits that network IT support personnel, security 
personnel, and decision makers must be able to recognize, understand, protect against, 
and recover from if need be. 
E.       IARM PROCESS 
The IARM process is a simple five-step process. It is a continuous process 
designed to detect, assess, and control risk to information while qualitatively enhancing 
computer network defense (CND) performance and maximizing network capabilities. It 
is adapted from the concept of applying a standard, systematic approach to minimizing 
risk that was originally developed to improve safety in the development of weapons, 
aircraft, space vehicles, and nuclear power and is used throughout the Navy in 
Operational Risk Management (ORM). The five steps are: 
1. Identify Vulnerabilities 
Identify potential causes of compromise to information in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Specific actions include identifying computer network assets 
and listing vulnerabilities in terms of its effects on security services. Assets can include 
hardware, software, data, services, people, documentation, policies and supplies. 
(Pfleeger, p.464) A table, as shown in Table 3-1, can be used to organize the association 
of vulnerabilities and assets. 
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Table 3-1. Assets and Security Services (After Pfleeger) 
2. Assess Vulnerabilities 
For each vulnerability identified, determine the associated risk in terms of severity 
and probability. Specific actions include assessing the exposure, severity and probability 
to the vulnerabilities listed in step 1. The Risk Assessment Code (RAC) chart in figure 3- 
3 can be used to accomplish this step. 
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Risk Assessment 
Code - ( RAC ) 
1 = Critical 
2 = Serious 
3 = Moderate 
4 = Minor 
5 = Negligible 
CAT I = Catastrophic 
consequences 
CAT 11 = Severe 
consequences 
CAT 111= Minor 
consequences 
CAT IV= Minimal 
consequences 



















Cat I 1 1 2 3 
Catn 1 2 3 
4 
Catm 2 3 4 5 
Cat IV 3 4 5 5 
Risk Levels 
Risk Assessment Code 
Figure 3-3. IARM Risk Assessment Code Chart (After U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
Using this matrix does not lessen the inherently subjective nature of risk 
assessment, however a matrix does afford a consistent framework for evaluating risk. 
Although different matrices may be used for various applications, any risk assessment 
tool should include the elements of vulnerability severity and threat probability. The 
RAC defined by a matrix represents the degree of risk associated with a vulnerability 
considering severity and probability. While the degree of risk is subjective in nature, the 
RAC does accurately reflect the relative amount of risk perceived between various 
vulnerabilities. Using the matrix, the RAC is derived as follows: 
a. Vulnerability Severity - An assessment of the worst credible consequence that 
can occur as a result of a vulnerability.    Severity is defined by potential degree of 
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information compromise, or loss of information all together (e.g., denial of service). The 
combination of two or more vulnerabilities may increase the overall risk. Vulnerability 
categories are assigned as Roman numerals according to the following criteria: 
(1) Category I - The vulnerability may cause catastrophic loss of information or 
grave damage to national interest. 
(2) Category II - The vulnerability may cause severe loss of information, severe 
damage to national or service interests, or severe degradation to efficient use of 
information. 
(3) Category III - The vulnerability may cause minor loss of information, minor 
damage to national, service, or command interests, or minor degradation to efficient use 
of information. 
(4) Category IV - The vulnerability may cause a minimal loss of information, 
minimal damage to national or service interests, or minimal degradation to efficient use 
of information. 
b. Exploitation Probability - the probability that a vulnerability will result in an 
actual exploitation (some degree of compromise of data or denial of service), based on an 
assessment of such factors as location, exposure, affected population, experience, or 
previously established statistical information. Exploitation probability will be assigned 
will be assigned an English letter according to the following criteria: 
(1) Sub-category A - Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of 
time. Expected to occur frequently to a computer network, servers, host or client. 
(2) Sub-category B - Probably will occur in time. Expected to occur several 
times to a computer network, server, host or client. 
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(3) Sub-category C - May occur in time.   Can reasonably be expected to occur 
sometime to a computer network, server, host or client. 
(4) Sub-category D - Unlikely to occur. 
c. Risk Assessment Code - The RAC is an expression of risk that combines the 
elements of vulnerability severity and exploitation probability. The RAC is expressed as 
a single Arabic numeral that can be used to help determine vulnerability control 
priorities. Note that in some cases, the worst credible consequence of a vulnerability may 
not correspond to the highest RAC for that vulnerability. For example, one vulnerability 
may have two potential consequences (loss of confidentiality - I and non-repudiation - 
HI). The severity of the worst consequence (loss of confidentiality) may be unlikely (D), 
resulting in RAC 3. The severity of the lesser consequence (III) may be likely (A), 
resulting in a RAC of 2. Therefore, it is also important to consider less severe 
consequences of a vulnerability if it is more likely than the worst credible consequence, 
since the combination may present greater overall risk. (OPNAVINST 3500.39, p. 7) 
3. Make Risk Decisions 
Develop risk control options, and then decide if benefits outweigh risks. Start 
with the most serious risk first. Specific actions include identifying control options, 
determining the effects of those controls, prioritizing risk control measures, selecting risk 
controls and making risk decisions. If risk outweighs benefit, or if assistance is required 
to implement controls, seek further controls or guidance from superiors. 
4. Implement Controls 
Once the risk decisions are made, implement selected controls. Specific actions 
include making implementation of the above controls clear, establishing accountability, 
and providing support.   If the control entails a new IT technology like implementing a 
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Virtual Private Network (VPN) for network traffic confidentiality, then it is vital that an 
investment be made into the people who will maintain and use it as well. A grouping of 
controls can be as follows: 
a. Controls that implement confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non- 
repudiation: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), secure protocols (EPSec), secure e-mail 
(PGP), network integrity controls (intrusion detection systems), operating system 
protection features (anti-virus software), Secure Shell (SSH), etc. These controls are 
most applicable to implementations at the application level. 
b. Controls that implement availability and access controls: network access 
controls (firewalls), secure-socket layer (SSL), identification, database and operating 
system access controls, etc. These controls are most applicable to implementations at the 
transport and network levels. 
c. Controls that protect the physical medium of transmission: link cryptography, 
spread-spectrum (low probability of detection and interception techniques (LPD and 
LPI)), etc. These controls are most applicable to the physical and data link levels. 
5. Supervise 
Some method of testing must be devised to ensure that the selected controls are 
performing as needed. A well-designed vulnerability assessment can satisfy this need. 
Care must be taken to watch for changes that could impact the original assumptions of 
the risk assessment. A change of this nature usually warrants initiating the IARM 
process again. Other specific actions include supervising the control implementation, 
continuously monitoring for effectiveness, and collecting feedback from non-involved IT 
support personnel and users. A summary of specific actions associated with each step of 
the IARM process is given below in figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4. The Cyclic IARM Process (After U.S. Air Force ORM Process) 
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F.        THE FOUR IARM PRINCIPLES 
These principles, as with ORM, are indispensable to making effective decisions 
concerning risk. They govern all actions associated with risk management. These 
principles are applicable before, during, and after all aspects of managing, maintaining, 
and developing computer network systems. They are listed again here. 
1. Accept No Unnecessary Risk 
Unnecessary risk comes without a commensurate return in terms of real benefits 
or available opportunities. Using and maintaining computer network systems involve 
risk to information. The most logical choices for interacting with these systems are those 
that meet all mission/task requirements with the minimum acceptable risk. The corollary 
to this axiom is "accept necessary risk" required to successfully complete the mission or 
task. 
2. Make Risk Decisions at the Appropriate Level 
Making risk decisions at the appropriate level establishes clear accountability. 
Those accountable for the success or failure of the task must be included in the risk 
decision process. The appropriate level for risk decisions is the one that can allocate the 
resources to reduce the risk or eliminate the threat and implement controls. Typically, the 
commander, leader, or individual responsible for executing the mission or task is: 
a. Authorized to accept levels of risk typical of the planned operation/task 
(i.e., possible loss or compromise of data and equipment, potential compromise of normal 
services offered). 
b. Required to elevate decisions to the next level in the chain of command 
after it is determined that controls available to him/her will not reduce residual risk to an 
acceptable level. 
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3. Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Costs 
All identified benefits should be compared to all identified costs. The process of 
weighing threats against potential vulnerabilities helps to maximize computer network 
defense (CND) performance. Even high-risk endeavors may be undertaken when there is 
clear knowledge that the sum of the benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. Balancing 
costs and benefits may be a subjective process and open to interpretation. Ultimately, the 
balance may have to be determined by the appropriate decision maker. 
4. Anticipate and Manage Risk by Planning 
Vulnerabilities and threats are more easily assessed and managed in the planning 
stages of maintaining, updating, or developing computer networks. Integrating risk 
management into these activities as early as possible provides the decision maker the 
greatest opportunity to apply IARM principles. Additionally, feedback must be provided 
to benefit future computer network related activities. 
G.       IARM VS. TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
Although the five steps of IARM are a lot like the decision-making process that 
good, security-knowledgeable IT support personnel would always use, applying a 
standard process is different in some important ways. 
- IARM is more systematic. Frequently, threat identification and vulnerability 
assessment is random, and highly dependent upon an individual's past experience and 
computer network skills. IARM requires users, IT support personnel and decision 
makers to focus on threat at a time, shoring up that vulnerability before moving on to the 
next. 
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- IARM is more proactive. It requires an attempt to identify ALL threats and 
potential exploits, not just the ones that have occurred on that computer network in the 
past. 
- IARM addresses all types of threats and vulnerabilities that could threaten our 
ability to keep network security services unimpaired (social engineering, virus detection, 
configuration management, user awareness, fiscal limitations, credibility, physical 
security, computer equipment failures, etc.) This allows effective prioritization of 
computer network related risks, which helps focus limited time/assets on the most 
important issues, rather than addressing security threats as an after-thought, once the 
policies have been formulated or computer network systems created. 
- IARM enhances communication about threats and vulnerabilities by providing a 
common process and set of terms. It provides a means to articulate concerns and justify 
decisions to those who may not be completely aware or knowledgeable on the risks 
entailed in using computer networks. 
Figure 3-5 below summarizes the differences in the two approaches. 
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IARM                       vs.            Traditional Approach 
Systematic                                                  Random, Individual-Dependent 
System View                                               Point Solutions 
Proactive                                                    Reactive 
Integrates All Types of                              Security as After-thought Once Computer 
Threats and Vulnerabilities                       Network Services are Initiated 
Into Planning 
Common Process/Terms of                        Non-standard 
Information Assurance 
Conscious Decision Based on                     "Can Do" Regardless of Risk 
Risk vs. Benefit 
Figure 3-5. IARM vs. Traditional Approach (After U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
H.       IARM LEVELS OF APPLICATION 
IARM is intended to be applied by all people who use, maintain, and manage 
information, as well as the computer network systems that may hold that information. 
Users, IT support personnel, and decision makers will thus devote different amounts of 
time and level of detail to the five steps of IARM, depending upon the circumstances. 
1.         Time-Critical 
In this case IARM entails a quick, mental review or discussion using the five 
steps during the conduct of an activity, or for crisis response planning. As an example, a 
user may receive an e-mail with an attachment that looks suspicious because it contains 
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more than two extensions (e.g., jpg.vbs). Should the user open the attachment? If it is 
not directly addressed in the unit's computer network use policies, the user may do a 
quick, mental run through of the five steps: 
(1) Identify Vulnerabilities: The e-mail attachment may contain a 
malicious program that could spread, unauthorized to other machines within the 
organization (attack on integrity). 
(2) Assess Vulnerabilities: What's the worst that could happen? The 
malicious program may be a Trojan for use by an intruder to gain access to other hosts, or 
a program to wipe out data on host computer within the organization (attack on 
availability). Since the user has had some information assurance awareness training, (i.e., 
IARM), they are aware that there is a likely occurrence, and thus a significant threat. 
(3) Make Risk Decisions: Given the above quick analysis, the user now 
needs to determine if there is an operational need to open the attachment now. If the user 
has the authority to make that risk decision, one is made (i.e., open it now or not). In the 
absences of such authority, the user would go up his/her chain of command. In this case, 
the user does not have the authority to make the risk decision, he/she notifies technical 
support. 
(4) Implement Controls: By not opening the attachment, or moving the 
attachment to an isolated system for investigation, the user is implementing the control 
(i.e., not opening suspicious attachments). 
(5) Supervise: The user is exercising self-supervision by being vigilant for 
such situations in the future and sharing the experience with fellow personnel. 
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2. Deliberate 
IARM is a slightly expanded, more detailed application of the five steps suited for 
planning for an operation or reviewing procedures. This process level is used when there 
is a good understanding of vulnerabilities based on experience and is summarized below. 
(1) Identify Vulnerabilities 
(a) Operation Analysis - an analysis of the specific computer network's 
services and protocols involved to accomplish them. 
(b) Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) - a list of vulnerabilities and 
associated causes for each step of the operation analysis. 
(i) List negative consequences 
(ii) List vulnerabilities 
(iii) List possible causes 
(2) Assess Vulnerabilities - using a matrix similar to the one in figure 3-1 
can facilitate this. 
(3) Make Risk Decisions 
(a) Consider Risk Control Options 
(i) Most Serious Risks First 
(ii) Refer to PHA Causes 
(b) Conduct a Risk vs. Benefit Analysis 
(c) Communicate as Required - If risks still out weigh benefits or 
additional resources are needed to implement selected controls, 
communicate this up the chain of command. 
(4) Implement Controls 
(5) Supervise 
3. In-Depth 
The five-step process for in-depth IARM is basically the same as that or the 
deliberate process, except that a more thorough vulnerability assessment (first two of the 
five steps) is conducted, and a training realism assessment can be added if applicable. 
The following can be some of the details that apply. 
a. Vulnerability Assessment 
This vulnerability assessment could involve research of available data, use 
of diagram and analysis tools, formal testing or long term tracking of the vulnerabilities 
associated with the operations of the computer network system.   Examples of in-depth 
53 
IARM applications include long-term planning of complex computer network operations, 
introduction of new computer equipment, materials and missions, protocols, training 
curricula, and major computer network system overhaul or repair. 
While there are a variety of automated vulnerability assessment tools that 
can be used to test current systems, there are also a variety of in-depth vulnerability 
analysis tools that can be used in the risk management portion of the development phase 
of a computer network system. The following techniques can be applied to established 
systems. While a detailed discussion of each of these techniques is outside the scope of 
this thesis, they are listed to demonstrate the flexibility of the IARM process. They 
include: 
- Analysis of Data 
-Cause and Effect Diagram 
-Tree Diagrams 
-Surveys 
-Simultaneously Timed Event Plotting (STEP) 
-Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
-Interface Analysis 
-Mapping 
-Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis 
b. Training Realism Assessment 
The idea behind the Training Realism Assessment is to minimize the 
differences between training and actual combat procedures. We in the military must be 
able to deal with scenarios that may include other aggressive, overt actions in conjunction 
with a computer network attack (CNA).   It is based on the fact that a risk control that 
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reduces training realism may increase risk to personnel and the mission in an actual 
combat situation. 
The method: 
1. Identify each control/procedure that is different from actual combat 
procedures. 
2. Challenge each one to determine why it is different. 
3. If the difference is valid (because of safety, resources, time, etc.), 
determine whether or not it has an undesired impact on training realism. Make 
adjustments to reduce undesired impact and identify any non-combat risk controls as 
"training only". 
Figure 3-6 depicts the Training Realism Assessment process, and can be 
used as a job aid to conduct a realistic, operational vulnerability assessment. 
If a risk control is needed, but it is not consistent with combat procedures, 
we must determine if there is a way to modify the control so that it can be used 
effectively in combat. An example might be making certain critical network systems off- 
limits to red teams during actual joint-fleet exercises for fear of degrading the over-all 
exercise. Designating a network system, or a portion of it, off-limits will obviously not 
be an option available in combat. However, we might be able to transfer the risk control 
functions of the need for a critical portion of the network to other systems or platforms 
within the exercise to achieve an acceptable level of risk while eliminating the unrealistic 
aspect of the training. These risk control functions would then be in effect during both 
combat and training. 
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How we fight   ► .*   How we train 
(Network Centric) I 
Differences 
I 
Challenge and Validate 
Not Needed - remove Needed - keep 
No Impact Undesired Impact 
Ignore 
Fix Can't Fix- 
Risk Decision 
Figure 3-6. Training Realism Assessment (After U.S. Navy & Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety ORM Presentation) 
If making a critical portion of the network off-limits to red teams is 
necessary due to the level of risk and experience of the personnel involved, the unrealistic 
effects of placing a critical network system off limits may be reduced by placing controls 
on the actual attacks a red team may simulate so as not to interfere with the overall 
operation. 
Finally, if the control is required for training, and its adverse impact 
cannot be reduced, we must at least ensure the trainees recognize that it is for "training 
only." 
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c.        Li Implementations for Systems 
Defining requirements is a very difficult task when making procurement 
decisions   for   information   systems   (IS).      An   IS's   performance,   usability,   and 
interoperability are often degraded by the requirement for the IA services described 
earlier.   Likewise, trying to first determine what the IA requirements are, and then 
second,   communicate  those  requirements  to  the   system  engineers  and   software 
developers who will actually design the implementations, can be as equally daunting. 
IARM's promotion of common IA terms can be used to establish IA criteria on which 
procurer and developer can agree upon before IA requirements are determined.   Once 
requirements are determined, the in-depth IARM process can be used to analyze the 
effectiveness of the proposed solutions in each cycle of the procurement process. 
A possible framework for presenting the IA requirements of some future 
IP-based information system implementation is illustrated below in figure 3-7. 
ISO Laver                 Security Problem                             Possible Solutions 
Application               Enforce: Application,                       SSH, PKI, S/MIME, 
Confidentiality, Authenticity,            PGP, Access Controls 
Integrity, Non-Repudiation of Data 
Transport/                 Enforce Network-Based                   Firewall, IDS, SSL, 
Network                  Confidentiality, Authenticity,            Access Controls, IPSec, 
Integrity, Perimeter Defense             VPN 
Data Link/                 Prevent Traffic Analysis (TA) and    Spread Spectrum, LPD/ 
Physical                   Traffic Flow Analysis (TFA),           LPI, Link Crypto 
Iinterception, Jamming 
Figure 3-7. Framework for Determining IA Requirements and Implementations 
for a Future IP-Based Information System 
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The above model lends itself to a logical division of developmental 
expertise. The application level requirements would be under the purview of software 
developers while the remaining two levels would fall under network design engineers. 
The above model also illustrates the utility of pushing many of the IA services needed as 
far up the ISO model as possible to promote interoperability. Likewise, we can see the 
utility and value of securing the data instead of concentrating on securing the 
"plumbing." 
After initial requirements and implementations are agreed upon, in-depth 
IARM can further be used by PMs (Program Manager) and IPTs (Integrated Procurement 
Teams) to justify the possible increase in cost or degradation in usability/interoperability 
those IA requirements can cause. 
I. BENEFITS OF IARM 
Though IARM, and risk management in general, is not very precise, it does offer 
benefits which can enhance a computer network system's defensive performance, in 
addition to those benefits listed above. It improves general network and information 
assurance awareness among users, IT support personnel and decision makers. Discussing 
issues of security can raise the general level of interest and concern. IT support personnel 
and decision makers may now have a comprehensive list of assets and vulnerabilities 
associated with those assets where none existed before. Decision makers now have an 
improved basis for implementing controls, justifying those controls which may prove 
inconvenient or expensive, and continuing the search for more effective controls should 
the need arise. Finally, IARM is a continuous, non-static process that can be applied by 
users, IT support personnel and decision makers alike, giving the whole chain of 
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command the opportunity to personally make a positive contribution to the Department of 
the Navy's computer network defense performance.     (Pfleeger, p.463) 
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rv.     CONCLUSIONS 
A.       VISION FOR IARM IMPACT ON OPERATIONS 
As the U.S. Navy moves forward with initiatives like IT-21, NMCI, and Network 
Centric Warfare, every command should be preparing for the inevitable deployment of 
IP-based communication systems. These systems will be exposed to many of the same 
threats and vulnerabilities that occur in corporate America, and on the Internet at large, 
making Computer Network Defense (CND) an area of critical operational importance. 
While there will undoubtedly be very clever and creative ways to technically master the 
information assurance issues of tomorrow, one area that has remained resistant to 
technological remedies will always be present - the human factor. As we have seen in 
Naval Aviation, much ingenuity and resources have been poured into making our 
weapons platforms safe to operate, yet Naval Aviation continued to suffer significant 
mishaps. With the incorporation of ORM, Naval Aviation, and the Fleet at large, has 
been able to concentrate on the human factors side of mishaps and bring about the safest 
period in our Navy's history. Safety has become the premier concern in making 
decisions about risk, and the lessons that Naval Aviation learned can be applied in the 
area of information assurance as well. It is culture and attitudes that are most difficult to 
change. As a process focused on people, IARM can facilitate a paradigm shift in the way 
that the DON develops and uses computer network systems so that information assurance 
is quantifiably executable when interacting with computer network systems. 
At the core of IARM, like ORM, is the goal of increasing the ability to make 
informed decisions by providing the best baseline of knowledge and experience available, 
through continuous and open communication. 
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B.        ESTABLISHING A KNOWLEDGE BASE 
One of the key elements that has made the Naval Aviation Safety Program 
effective is the establishment of a detailed mishap and hazard reporting system. This 
system facilitates the establishment of a knowledge base of mishap and hazard causes, 
recommendations for correcting the determined causes, and a mechanism for 
implementing the corrections when it involves several different commands or 
organizations. Naval Aviation places such a premium on the thorough investigation of a 
mishap that the data and facts gathered in such an investigation fall under the concept of 
"privileged information" (for class 'C mishaps and greater). Privileged information 
collected as a result of a class 'C or greater mishap investigation cannot be used for 
punitive purposes against any individual. This concept promotes more openness among 
investigation witnesses so that the true causes of a mishap can be determined. The results 
of these investigations are maintained by the Naval Safety Center that makes possible 
various kinds of statistical analysis of the determined causes of mishaps. This provides 
an indispensable knowledge base from which commands may use during the ORM 
process to improve their safety performance. 
Computer Network Defense (CND) can benefit from a similar knowledge base of 
the causes of successful and near-successful IA attacks. Investigations modeled after 
those conducted for safety mishaps can be used and the results maintained by the Fleet 
Information Warfare Center (FIWC). FIWC's assignment as the Naval Computer 
Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT) makes it readily suited to establishing such a 
knowledge base. The sanitized results of the investigations can be promulgated to all 
pertinent commands along with the needed corrective actions. The concept of privilege 
may even be applied to the investigations if some previously agreed to threshold of 
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damage from the incident is exceeded. The establishment of a knowledge base and 
promulgation of the causes and corrective actions to IA attacks can prevent other 
commands or organizations within the DON from falling victim to the same attacks. This 
can be particularly useful in the operational environment were rapid personnel turn over 
inhibits the ability to preserve corporate memory in many commands. 
ORM also enjoys widespread implementation throughout the Fleet because each 
unit has a safety function that is well trained, and can facilitate its practical application at 
the unit level. To promote the practical implementation of IARM throughout the Fleet, 
appendix A is offered as an outline to a possible approach to offer more in-depth courses 
for IT support personnel, system administrators, IT officer specialists, and decision 
makers. 
C.        THESIS APPLICATION TO OTHER MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS 
ORM is already being implemented throughout the Fleet. This thesis aims to 
make a connection between the risk management that commands exercise over the 
hazards that threaten the safety of personnel and equipment, and the computer and 
people-based vulnerabilities that threaten our information systems and the data it carries. 
Computer based information systems are deployed through out the Fleet and serve to fill 
vital functions in the day-to-day activities of many commands. Reliance on these 
systems will only continue to increase. 
While the NMCI is intended to cover the vast majority of the DON's shore-based 
information service requirements, it does not extend to our embarked commands and 
ships. These units can use the IARM process to: 
-Improve computer and network security awareness 
63 
-Identify assets, vulnerabilities, and controls 
-Provide a basis for decisions 
-Justify expenditures for security 
IARM forces a systematic study of the vulnerabilities in an information system 
(IS). Security requirements often make an IS more costly to manage, less convenient for 
users, and function at less than optimal performance capability. IARM can aid decision 
makers in deciding how much security is right for their systems and justify those 
penalties that security often produces. 
The discussion generated over risk management can improve the security 
awareness of users, IT support personnel and decision makers alike, thus aiding in 
complying with OPNAVINST 5239. IB, "Navy Information Assurance Program." It can 
serve to make everyone knowledgeable of the unit's and DON's security policies, the 
risks and potential losses that could be experienced by not following those policies, and 
identify where more training may be needed. By each individual applying the principles 
of IARM at their level, they can bring unacceptable risks to the attention of the chain of 
command. 
D.       FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
While researching this thesis, the author discovered other subjects that would be 
excellent topics for future thesis research. These include: 
• A thorough look into the Navy's network security policies in light of new 
technologies (e.g., VPNs), and the manner in which they are written from an 
organizational-behavior perspective. Poor policy is often the root cause of 
network security breaches.   A recommendation on how policies should be 
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written to be more easily understood, updated and adhered to could be best 
application of this research. 
• Vulnerabilities need to be researched in conjunction with networks and remote 
access, specifically how to best prevent subversion of remote systems, such as 
home users. A "honey pot" concept could be used in an attempt to ascertain 
or update previously unknown methods and types of attacks. 
• The use of Intrusion Detection Systems to populate a DON-wide database on 
the types and frequency of known intrusion attempts on DON computer 
network systems in order to build a signature-based library of intrusion 
techniques. 
• Inclusion into DON networks of patternless or non-pattern, non-signature 
based intrusion detection methods when available. 
• The development of a structured approach to investigating and documenting 
successful and near-successful computer network security breaches. The 
approach can be modeled after the Navy and Marine Corps' Aviation Safety 
Mishap Investigation (MIRs) and Hazard (HAZREPs) Reporting system. 
• The development of a program or course of study to certify decision makers 
as qualified to accept the risk over decisions concerning computer network 
and other information systems. A track similar to the SANS Institute GIAC 
certification process can be developed. 
• The development of an online scenario-based test to maintain information 
assurance awareness among all DON personnel, possibly tailored to different 
levels of users. 
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E.        FINAL COMMENTS 
This final section is dedicated to some observations from the author, his advisors 
and a fellow student.  When ORM was first introduced into the Fleet, it was met with 
much skepticism as being another Navy program that would require some amount of 
administration to comply with its mandates.    Fortunately, in practice, that did not 
materialize. The author was fortunate enough to have served with a very talented aviator, 
graduate of the Navy's Test Pilot School (TPS), he was the Executive Officer (XO) in my 
last squadron.   As the Safety Officer, I was looking for practical ways to implement 
ORM into our squadron's pre-flight briefings. My XO conveyed to me how it was used 
when he was a student at TPS. He was a proponent of a structured approach to examine 
the hazards that we as aviators face during every mission, regardless of the mission's 
level of difficulty. The outcome was that a short section of each brief would be dedicated 
to a discussion on the potential hazards that might be encountered on the mission and on 
the controls that the participants would use to manage the risk those hazards posed. The 
Commanding Officer vocally endorsed this approach. Before long, all the aviators of the 
squadron realized we were just vocalizing a common sense approach to doing our jobs 
more safely. The ultimate result was that those short discussions raised safety awareness 
throughout the squadron and allowed the junior aviators to learn from the experiences of 
the senior aviators in an environment other than the Officer's club! The author hopes that 
IARM can facilitate a similar paradigm shift in the area of information assurance. 
Risk analysis, in general, has been criticized for many reasons. Many risk 
analysis methods require assigning dollar amounts to assets. This can be difficult, 
especially when your assets are intangibles like, data, reputation and proprietary 
knowledge.  These dollar values also lead to a false sense of precision or security.  The 
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important aspect of these values is the relative size each holds against the other. The 
differences indicate where controls should first be placed and where further analysis 
warranted. Finally, once a risk analysis is done, it is usually filed away and forgotten, or 
is used again a year later. Ideally, risk analysis should be conducted whenever conditions 
change. (Pfleeger, pp. 470-471) This is a good argument for incorporating IARM as a 
continuous risk analysis process. 
A fellow student working on his thesis concerning VPN implementations 
observed that, "too many people are too concerned with bit length of keys and 
implementations of PPTP, and not enough about what is the value of the data that is 
trying to be protected." IARM is a process to deal with exactly this kind of question. 
The IARM process can aid in facilitating a determination on exactly what needs to be 
protected and the most efficient way to go about it. 
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APPENDIX A. PROPOSED INFORMATION ASSURANCE RISK 
MANAGEMENT (IARM) CURRICULA 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has many areas of academic excellence 
that can be brought together to promote IA in the DON. The Center for Information 
Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) is already an acknowledged center of 
excellence in the field of computer security. The Center for Executive Education (CEE) 
holds Flag-level seminars on revolutionary business practices and enjoys an excellent 
reputation among the senior leadership of the Navy. The Information Warfare systems 
engineering curriculum is active in developing different taxonomies of Information 
Operations (10). IA can most benefit from a multi-disciplinary approach that includes 
computer science, information technology management, organizational behavior and 
Information Operations. These areas of study can be combined into an "Institute for 
Information Superiority (IIS)." This center can study how information has become the 
center of gravity for many functions in today's world and the future. From business 
commerce to military operations, information, and its unhampered distribution, is seen as 
the key competitive edge needed to gain the advantage in many confrontational and 
competitive situations. How that information is managed, protected and distributed can 
be the focus of such a center. Also, similar to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps 
School of Aviation Safety and the Naval Safety Center and their positions as the 
standard-bearers, developers and promoters of ORM throughout the Fleet, the IIS can 
easily assume the same position vis-ä-vis IARM. 
One of the key reasons ORM has been adopted throughout the Fleet is because 
senior decision makers have been convinced of its applicability and utility in preventing 
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mishaps.    With its established credibility and reputation, NPS can have tremendous 
influence over those same decision makers DOD wide. NPS can leverage this advantage 
by offering a weeklong, executive level course to senior decision makers (0-5 and above, 
and GS equivalent) on information assurance and its importance to the DON mission. 
This course would introduce the basics of information assurance and the critical role 
decision makers play in managing the risks associated with our computer networks.  It 
would have at its core the IARM process. This course could use the same philosophical 
approach as the Aviation Safety School's six-day Aviation Safety Commander (ASC) 
course offered to unit Commanding Officers, Officers-in-Charge, and Safety Officers of 
major commands.    An NPS executive level course can be instrumental in raising 
awareness of network security and IA issues and the concepts of IARM given our 
increased reliance on computer networks and the information it carries.   It may also 
facilitate meeting the Presidential Decision Directive 63  (PDD-63) requirement to 
improve the security capabilities of our nation's cyber-based critical infrastructure, and 
thus be applicable DOD wide. 
ORM enjoys widespread implementation throughout the Fleet because each unit 
has a safety function that is well trained, and can facilitate its practical application at the 
unit level. To promote the practical implementation of IARM throughout the Fleet, the 
IIS can also offer a more in-depth course for senior IT support personnel and those 
individuals assigned with network security duties. This course could emulate the 
approach that the Aviation Safety School uses with its 28 instructional-day course for 
unit Aviation Safety Officers. This IT support personnel/information systems security 
officer (ISSO) course can be tailored to focus on officer IT specialist and enlisted IT 
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support corps.  This advanced course can be divided into the following areas, much like 
the SANS Institute uses during its conferences: 
-Fundamentals of Information Assurance 
-Firewalls and Perimeter Protection 
-Intrusion Detection Systems 
-Incident Handling 
-Current High-Threat Vulnerabilities and Cracker Exploits 
-Effective Audit and Vulnerability Assessment 
-IARM 
The above two courses can be offered in cooperation with other DOD, 
government, academic or civilian institutions (e.g., SANS Institute, Carnegie Mellon, 
National Security Agency (NSA), Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), etc.) and 
tailored to the needs of the participants if warranted. Classified portions of the above 
courses can also be offered as NPS has the required facilities to do this, and would make 
the executive level course more worthwhile for busy senior decision makers. 
It is recognized that there are other entities endeavoring to accomplish these ends, 
but a more coordinated effort will gain efficiencies where none exist now. NPS is 
uniquely positioned to straddle the boundaries between the military, government, 
academia and industry to realize these efficiencies. The NPS IIS can ultimately serve as 
the center for DON's efforts to improve IA throughout the Fleet, and possibly throughout 
the Federal Government. 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) can test some of the concepts above by 
first introducing them into the Information Strategy and Operations (ISO) curriculum. 
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The purpose of the ISO curriculum is to "develop a cadre of Unrestricted Line (URL) 
Officers with the expertise to innovatively create concepts of war fighting and the 
application of information technology (IT) to implement them operationally." This cadre 
would benefit greatly from a thorough understanding of being able to apply the principles 
of ORM to IA (i.e., IARM) because they are the ones expected to facilitate the integration 
of IT into all the Navy does operationally. 
The following is offered as a possible outline of IA curricula that can be applied 
to four target groups: Line officers, IT officer corps, enlisted IT support corps, and 
general users, and emulates closely the approach taken to implement ORM throughout 
the fleet. The note slides in appendix B is offered as the basis for an indoctrination 
presentation for IARM. 
A.        INDOCTRINATION TRAINING OUTLINE 
Audience:       All Users 
The purpose of this curriculum is to provide a basic understanding of what IA is, 
what risk management is, the benefits derived from it, the concepts that apply to it, and 
how to do time critical IARM. Content: 
• IARM terms and definitions 
• IARM introduction concept 
• Four principles of IARM 
• IARM vs. traditional approach 
• Benefits of IARM 
• Three levels of I ARM 
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• Time critical IARM, examples and demonstrations 
• Specific applications (demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes and 
procedures) 
Appendix B is offered as a possible presentation for this course 
B.       USER OUTLINE 
Audience:       Junior IT Support Personnel 
This curriculum is applicable to all users who use IT as a vital portion of their 
everyday duties, and the more junior members of the IT support corps referred to below, 
with the purpose of expanding their understanding of IA and the deliberate five-step 
process of IARM. Content: Indoctrination Training plus: 
• Fundamentals of Information Assurance (I A) 
• Deliberate IARM process and demonstration 
• Basic vulnerability identification, tools, examples 
• Vulnerability assessment tools and examples 
• Risk assessment tools and examples 
• Deliberate IARM practical exercise 
• Specific applications (demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes and 
procedures) 
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C.       INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT CORPS OUTLINE 
Audience:       Experienced IT Support Personnel and System Administrators 
This curriculum is applicable to those more senior who actually maintain, support 
and administrate information systems within their commands with the purpose of 
expanding their understanding of current threats and vulnerabilities, and provide the tools 
necessary for implementing IARM in their command. Content: Users curriculum plus: 
• Advanced Information Assurance 
• Firewalls and Perimeter Protection 
• Intrusion Detection Systems 
• Incident Handling 
• Current High-Threat Vulnerabilities and Cracker Exploits 
• Basics of effective Audit and Vulnerability Assessment 
• In-depth vulnerability identification tools and examples 
• Risk assessment tools and examples (cross section of available tools) 
• Command implementation and leadership concepts 
• Specific application (demonstrating applicability to existing IA processes and 
procedures) 
D.       INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) OFFICER CORPS OUTLINE 
Audience:       IT Officer Specialist 
This curriculum is applicable to those officers who are the enablers of the 
integration of IT into the everyday activities that are performed in the DON with the 
purpose to give enough knowledge to understand in-depth and deliberate IARM, what 
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IARM can provide, and how to implement it within their units.   Contents: IT Support 
Corps curriculum plus: 
• Introduction to Information Operations (IO)/Information Warfare (IW) 
• Advanced studies on the current threats and vulnerabilities 
• Specific applications 
E.        SENIOR LEADERSHIP OUTLINE 
Audience:       0-5 and Above (GS equivalent) 
This curriculum is applicable to the senior leadership in the DON who will make 
IARM implementation effective through control of the rewards system used in the DON, 
with the purpose to provide a basic understanding of the IARM process, the benefits 
derived from it, the three levels and some of the applications of IARM. Content: 
• IA background 
• Current threats and recent exploitations (classified if necessary) 
• Three levels of IARM 
• Five step process of IARM 
• IARM vs. traditional approach 
• Specific fleet applications 
• Benefits of IARM 
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APPENDIX B. POWERPOINT PRESENTATION NOTE SLIDES 






You've all practiced Risk Management during your careers, or you wouldn't 
be here. However, the risk posed to our information and data are significant. 
We here accounts everyday how civilian and DOD systems are being hacked 
and major commerce sites being brought down. With our going to the NMCI, 
and working on ways to tactically take advantage of information systems, like 
in Network Centric Warfare. The need for effective Computer Network 
Defense (CND) becomes readily apparent. 
Information Assurance Risk Management doesn't just improve security 
awareness, but it improves our ability to accomplish our mission efficiently 
and effectively. 
The introductory training which follows is designed to give the audience a 
basic understanding of IARM. Everyone in the command, from the most 
junior person to the CO, should receive introductory training. 
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The Goal 
Build on the Success of Operational 
Risk Management - ORM 
Develop Information Assurance Risk 
Management - IARM From the 
Processes and Principles of ORM 
Begin with: 
Information Assurance Risk Management (IARM) is a form of Operational 
Risk Management (ORM). ORM has and is used to improve safety throughout 
the Fleet. In the same way IARM can be used to improve Computer Network 
Defense (CND) by developing effective Information Assurance (IA) practices 
and raising overall security awareness. 
We'll discuss the origin and basics of ORM, then apply it to the area of IA. 
Lastly. We'll finish with an overview of the IARM process. 
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Organizational Culture 
"The way we do things here " 
• Fundamental building blocks 
• Group values and standards 
• Medium for growth 
• Shaped by leadership 
Drives key decisions 
5010 
ORM is designed to change culture. It strives to change the way we perform 
everyday tasks, and that's not easy! 
How do we change people's attitudes and actions??? 
Good Organizational Culture requires a visionary leader, enhances people 
development, requires straight talk, mandates that you hire/fire the right 
people, and demands accountability - no act goes unnoticed. 
What is the Outcome from a good organizational culture? 
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Desired Cultural Attitudes 
• Accountability 
• Integrity 
• Focus on standards 
• Continuous and open communication 
• Intolerance for non-compliance Not all neiative 
• Consistent decisions Mentors Professional 
critique 
• Teamwork 
HOW DO WE ... IMPROVE THE ...- Organization 
- Culture 
- Process 
As we are beginning to see, theses attributes just don't apply to present 




©     -»sgl 
I 
CO's should ensure ORM is implemented 
into all levels of the command. Examples 
include, but are not limited to: 
• Train all personnel on ORM process. 
• Incorporate identified hazards, 
assessments & controls into briefs, 
notices, and written plans. 
• Conduct thorough risk assessments 
for all new or complex evolutions, 
defining acceptable risk and possible 
contingencies for the evolution. 
As the instructions directs, ORM applies to all activities, both on and off duty! 




'ORM applies across the entire spectrum of 
naval activities, from joint operations and 
fleet exercises to our daily routine. We must 
encourage top down interest in the ORM 
process, from the flag level all the way to 
the deckplates." 
- ADM J. Johnson, CNO 
Read the former CNO's quote. Note that the present CNO, ADM Clark, is 
also a supporter. 
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ORM Process 
Here is depicted the 5 steps of ORM in a pie diagram to help you visualize 
where we are going before we begin the IARM process. Note that it is a 





ORM is a PROCESS, lust like we will show IARM to be a process.   This is not a new program to 
be added to inspection checklists. 
Risk Management will eventually become a way of life to each individuals way of thinking. 
The CMC/CNO ORM instruction calls for no additional administrative burden and the same 
applies to IARM. 
The speaker may corroborate this aspect of ORM through any personal, first hand experience. 




> A Decision Making Tool 
> Increases Ability to Make 
Informed Decisions 
> Reduces Risks to Acceptable 
Levels 
The ORM process: 
- is a decision making tool which can be used by people at all levels to increase operational 
effectiveness. 
- increases the ability to make informed decisions by providing the best baseline of 
knowledge and experience available. 
- minimizes risks to acceptable levels by systematically applying controls to each risk which 
is not acceptable. The amount of risk we will take in war is much greater than that we should 
be willing to take in peace, but the same systematic process should be used to evaluate risks 
in both situations. 
Many you now be making a connection between the relationship of ORM and safety, and the 
similar relationship between IARM and security. 
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Operational Risk Management 
Goal: 
To optimize operational 
capability and readiness by 
managing risk to accomplish the 
mission with minimal loss. 
Obviously, we can't eliminate risk in our everyday activities, but we can 
reduce the amount of loss we experience (in data loss and compromise, 
equipment and mission accomplishment). 
87 
14 
Why do we need IARM? 
♦ Information Systems are Mission Critical 
♦ IT-21, NMCI, Network Centric Warfare 
♦ Increased Connectivity 
♦ Increased Reliance on Computer Networks 
♦ Development of Information Operations 
♦ Increased Importance of Computer 
Network Defense (CND) 
♦ Pursuant to a Defense-in-Depth Strategy 
From the NMCI Information Security fact sheet: 
"With the significant benefits of increasing network connectivity comes a 
corresponding increase in the potential for detrimental information warfare 
(IW) attacks and physical threats from natural and man-made disasters. As 
modern warfare becomes more dependent on information technology (IT) 
resources like NMCI services, NMCI network defense must be viewed as a 
Defensive warfare activity." 
The trend for relying on information systems is only increasing! 
IARM is Defense-in-Depth for the weak link in computer network and 




♦Causes of Risk 
♦5-Step IARM Process 
♦4 IARM Principles 
♦3 Levels of IARM 
♦Benefits of IARM 
♦Time-critical IARM 






A security service used to provide 
assurance that information is not 
disclosed to unauthorized persons, 
processes, or devices. 
Read definition. A security service used to provide assurance that information 
is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes, or devices. 
Traffic flow and traffic analysis are examples of threats to confidentiality. 
Threats to confidentiality are usually characterized as passive as the attacker 




A security service that ensures an 
information system (IS) operates 
without unauthorized modification, 
alteration, impairment, or destruction 
of any of its components. 
Read definition. A security service that ensures an information system (IS) 
operates without unauthorized modification, alteration, impairment, or 




A security service that ensures 
transmitted data is always available 
or prevents any degradation 
in availability. 
Read definition. A security service that ensures transmitted data is always 
available or prevents any degradation in availability. 
Some of the network support types might assert that availability is up time 
divided by total time. That's perfectly correct, but we are trying to frame these 
terms in an information assurance context. This illustrates a very good point, 
depending on where your focus is within the functions of an information 
system dictates the type of language used. IARM attempts to get everyone 




A security service or measure 
designed to establish the validity of a 
transmission, message, or originator; 
or as a means of verifying a user's 
authorization to access specific types 
of information. 
Read definition. A security service or measure designed to establish the 
validity of a transmission, message, or originator; or as a means of verifying a 




A security service that prevents 
either a sender or receiver of 
transmitted data from denying 
its transmission or reception. 
Read definition. A security service that prevents either a sender or receiver of 




A security service that limits and 
controls the access to information 
system (IS) resources to authorized 
users, programs, processes, or other 
systems. 
Read definition. A security service that limits and controls the access to 
information system (IS) resources to authorized users, programs, processes, or 
other systems. 
Note: We are not just talking about the log on window you see when you step 
up to a WINTEL work station, but the services that control who or what talks 




A form of possible loss or harm in a 
computing system. 




Any circumstance or event that could 
harm a critical asset through 
unauthorized access, compromise of 
data integrity, denial or disruption of 
service or physical destruction or 
impairment. 
Read definition. Any circumstance or event that could harm a critical asset 
through unauthorized access, compromise of data integrity, denial or 
disruption of service or physical destruction or impairment. 
This can also be any attack that takes advantage of a vulnerability, (e.g., buffer 
overflow, social engineering, spoofing, eavesdropping, etc.) Flooding or 




A flaw in security procedures, software, 
internal systems controls, or implementation 
of an IS that may cause any of the security 
services (i.e., those services defined earlier) 
to be degraded or defeated. Vulnerabilities 
include flaws that may be deliberately 
exploited and those that may cause failure 
due to inadvertent human actions or natural 
disasters 
Read definition. A flaw in security procedures, software, internal systems 
controls, or implementation of an IS that may cause any of the security 
services (i.e., those services defined above) to be degraded or defeated. 
Vulnerabilities include flaws that may be deliberately exploited and those that 
may cause failure due to inadvertent human actions or natural disasters. 
Most of us think of data loss or compromise when we think of information 
systems vulnerabilities. But, remember the last part of this 
definition...anything which can cause an information systems' security to be 
degraded is a vulnerability (e.g., Used for Distributed Denial of Service 
Attacks (DDoS)). That includes enemy threats, security threats, natural 
threats, inefficient use of assets, training degradation, something which could 





Read definition. Expression of possible loss in terms of severity and 
probability. 





Read definition. For the purposes of IARM, severity is the worst credible 
consequence which can occur as a result of a vulnerability. It is the potential 
degree of data loss or compromise. It is an expression of how serious the 
compromise, how much equipment damage, how much lost time, money, man- 




Likelihood that a vulnerability 
will result in data loss or compromise. 
Also includes the loss of 
integrity in the network. 
Read definition. The likelihood that a vulnerability will result in data loss or 
compromise is based on factors such as location, exposure, personnel, 
experience and historical information. 
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Vulnerability Risk 





of Sniffing/Use SSH 
Untested Software 
or Default Setups 
Some Chance of 
Compromise/Test 
Discuss the difference between a vulnerability and risk as some may confuse the two. Go 
back to the vulnerability definition slide if need be. 
Weak passwords are a vulnerability. The associated risk is there is a high 
probability of a successful attack on access control by someone being able to guess the 
password and gain unauthorized access. 
Unencrypted authentication is a vulnerability. The associated risk is that 
there is a moderate probability of a successful attack on confidentiality by someone sniffing 
your collision domain and being able to read authentication data. 
Untested or default setups are a vulnerability. The associated risk is that 
there is some chance a successful attack on availability as an untested program may have a 
virus that reformats hard drives, or some chance of a successful attack on access control as not 
all the security features may be enabled on a default installation. 
Note: Some may point out that the vulnerabilities listed above are just the symptoms of true 
vulnerabilities, which are breaches of a system's security service cited earlier. Recall the 
definition of a vulnerability: 
A flaw in security procedures, software, internal systems controls, or 
implementation of an IS that may cause any of the security services (i.e., those services 
defined earlier) to be degraded or defeated. Vulnerabilities include flaws that may be 
deliberately exploited and those that may cause failure due to inadvertent human actions or 
natural disasters. 
We are interested in discovering the flaws and symptoms so that the 
vulnerabilities to our security services can be identified and thus remedied if possible. 




The process of detecting 
vulnerabilities and assessing 
associated risks. 
Read definition. Risk assessment is the first two steps of the five step risk 
management process 
FIRST: 
1. Identify vulnerabilities 





A method for reducing risk for an 
identified vulnerability by lowering 
the probability of occurrence, 
decreasing potential severity, or both. 
Read definition. RADM Giffin, during his last GW battle group's 
deployment required his staff to present both types of controls for significant 
risks when using ORM for their activities. The first would lower the 
probability of something bad happening; the second would decrease the 




Actions taken to affect an adversary's 
information and information systems 
while defending one's own 
information and information systems 
Read Definition. Actions taken to affect an adversary's information and 
information systems while defending one's own information and information 
systems. 
Note: It may be worthwhile to note that we are not just talking about 
computers systems, but the whole range of information systems that we rely on 
to move information around. These systems are becoming more critical in the 






Information Operations that protect 
and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. 
Read Definition. Information Operations that protect and defend information 
and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 






The process of dealing with risk to 
information and data that is inherently 
associated with information operations 
and information systems, which includes 
risk assessment, risk decision-making, and 
implementation of effective risk controls 
Read Definition. The process of dealing with risk to information and data that 
is inherently associated with information operations and information systems, 
which includes risk assessment, risk decision-making, and implementation of 
effective risk controls. 
Note: IARM is not just for computer networks, but includes any information 





Likelihood that a vulnerability 
will result in data loss or compromise. 
Also includes the loss of 
integrity of the system. 
Read definition. The likelihood that a vulnerability will result in data loss or 
compromise is based on factors such as location, exposure, personnel, 
experience and historical information. 
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Causes of Risk 
"Eligible Receiver" 
Crackers   o> 
to     Potential Adversaries s° % / - «—«it 
^ Influences       :3-<§- 
cf^* New Technology % $. 
"MoonlightMaze" %%" * 
Poorly Written Software *% 
The causes of risk to the security of information systems are great and varied. 
One has only to pick up the newspaper to read about some intrusion of a major 
commercial or government site. 
Point out what Social Engineering is and that the only sure way to protect 
against it is effective user training. 
Certainly the risk that Navy computer networks face are as great as any a 
fleet unit would face in its normal operating environment! 
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Causes of Risk 
Change - The "Mother" of Risk 
* Resource Constraints 
* New Technology 
* Complexity 
* Stress 
These are some of the things we face in the naval service which tend to cause risk. Thses apply to 
all facets of our daily activity: 
- Change is the big one...anything from adding a new user to changing a networks' configuration. 
Changes should alert us to new hazards and increased risk. 
- "Doing more with less" seems to be the motto of the naval service...how long can we keep 
stretching our resources? What's the risk involved? 
- New technology is great, but sometimes the gain from increased capabilities is offset by our 
human abilities to absorb all the new information or adapt to the new equipment. How much 
training to maintainers get when we add a new device like a VPN to a network? 
- The more complex the problem, usually, the riskier. There are more ways for things to go 
wrong. 
- We see in an analysis of mishap causal factors that human error occurs in 80% of our mishaps. 
Stress significantly affects the ability of those humans to perform! 
Ill 
15 
Causes of Risk 
(Cont.) 
Human Nature 
* High Energy Levels 
* Societal Constraints 
* Environmental Influences 
Speed/Tempo of Operation 
- Humans tend to make mistakes, miscommunicate, have personality conflicts, get fatigued, get 
complacent and so on. We need to recognize the potential for human nature to present risk in 
our operations. 
- Nervous energy, excitement associated with new situations and perceived pressure to perform 
can all increase risk (ie, NATOPS check, AC emergency). A recent study of AERLANT/ 
AIRPAC mishaps shows that 56% of the deployment mishaps over the past 5 years (FY91 
through 1st quarter FY96) occurred during the first two months of deployment. 
- Society's standards and expectations drive public opinion, which has an important bearing on 
our budget and livelihood. So things which negatively affect our command image in the public 
eye can certainly present risk to our organization (and our careers). Crashing into a school, for 
example, is simply unacceptable. 
-Environment (e.g.. weather, sea state) is always a significant consideration in naval operations. 
- Risk certainly increases when the tempo of operations is high. It can also increase when the 
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This slide is presented as a review of the threats to the flow of information that 
information systems are exposed to in a normal operating environment. 
A threat is anything that can copy, modify, disrupt, or destroy 
information and data. 
The SANS Institute keeps an ongoing list of the top 10 security vulnerabilities 
at www.sans.org/topten.html. Obviously, this SANS list applies 
predominately to computer networks. 
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Think of IARM as a 5-4-3 process. 
5 STEPS 
4 PRINCIPLES 




"'Make risk decisions 
"'implement Controls 
"'Supervise 
IARM is a simple five-step process. The concept of applying a standard, systematic approach to minimizing 
risk was originally developed to improve safety in the development of weapons, aircraft, space vehicles and 
nuclear power. As I mentioned earlier, it has been embraced by many civilian corporations and the Army, 
and is now being implemented in the Navy, USMC, Air Force and Coast Guard. 
Although a risk management process like this has been part of the NAVOSH program for years, it has 
traditionally been applied primarily to workplace hazards. However, this process is also effective when 
applied to planning, operations, training and procedures. The five steps are: 
—Identify vulnerabilities. Identify potential causes of loss or compromise to information and data, damage to 
system hardware or mission degradation. 
-Assess vulnerabilities. For each vulnerability identified, determine the associated risk in terms of severity 
and probability. 
—Make risk Decisions. Develop risk control options, then decide if benefit outweighs risk. Seek further 
controls or guidance from CoC, if necessary. 
—Implement Controls. Once risk decision is made, implement selected controls. 
—Supervise. Follow-up to ensure controls are working and watch for changes. 
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1. Risk is inherent in using information systems, and is related to usability. Normally, the greater the 
usability of a system, the greater the risk. 
2. We must take only the risks which are necessary to meet the mission requirements of the system. 
3. Risks are more easily controlled when they are identified early in the planning process. This applies 
to adding new hardware and software, adding new users, or developing new network systems (e g 
NMCI) 
4. Normally, this is the leader directly responsible for the network system. However, when that leader 
determines that the risk is too high, or goes beyond the commander's stated intent, he should seek 
additional guidance from the chain of command. 
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The amount of time and level of detail involved in the five steps varies, depending upon the 
circumstances. 
Time-critical IARM entails a quick, mental review or discussion using the five steps during the 
execution phase of operations/training and for crisis response planning. 
Example of Time-critical IARM: Suspicious Content on a workstation 
Deliberate IARM is a slightly expanded, more detailed application of the five steps in planning 
for an operation or reviewing procedures. This process level is used when there is a good 
understanding of the vulnerabilities based on experience. 
Example of Deliberate IARM:   Pre or inter configuration planning (i.e., before 
and between accreditations possibly). 
In-depth IARM is basically the same as deliberate, but with a more thorough risk assessment 
(first two steps). It is used to more thoroughly explore the vulnerabilities and their associated risk 
in a complex operation or system, or one in which the vulnerabilities are not well understood. 
Example of In-depth IARM: Employment of a new network system 
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IARM Process 
To summarize, we've depicted the 5 steps of IARM in a pie diagram to help 
you visualize the continuous nature of the IARM process. 
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IARM vs. Traditional Approach 
Systematic 
Proactive 
Integrates All Types of 




Security As After-thought Once 
Computer Network Services are 
Initiated 
Common Process/Terms Non-standard 
of Information Assurance 
Conscious Decision        "Can Do" Regardless of Risk 
Based on Risk vs. Benefit 
Although the five steps of IARM are a lot like the decision-making process that good, 
security-knowledgeable system administrators would always used, applying a standard 
process is different in some important ways. 
- IARM is more systematic. Frequently, threat identification and vulnerability assessment is 
random, and highly dependent upon an individual's past experience and computer network 
skills. IARM requires users, system administrators and decision makers to focus on threat at 
a time, shoring up that vulnerability before moving on to the next. 
- IARM is more proactive. It requires an attempt to identify ALL threats and potential 
exploits, not just the ones that have occurred on that computer network in the past. 
- IARM addresses all types of threats and vulnerabilities that could threaten our ability to 
keep network security services unimpaired (social engineering, virus detection, configuration 
management, user awareness, fiscal limitations, credibility, physical security, computer 
equipment failures, etc.) This allows effective prioritization of computer network related 
risks, which helps focus limited time/assets on the most important issues, rather than 
addressing security threats as an after-thought, once the policies have been formulated or 
computer network systems created. 
- IARM enhances communication about threats and vulnerabilities by providing a common 
process and set of terms. It provides a means to articulate concerns and justify decisions to 




The Benefits of IARM 
> Reduction in Intrusions 
> Increased Security Awareness 
> Improved Computer 
Network Defense (CND) 
Though IARM, and risk management in general, is not very precise, it does offer benefits which 
can enhance a computer network system's defensive performance, in addition to those benefits 
listed above. It improves general security and information assurance awareness among users, IT 
support personnel and decision makers. Discussing issues of security can raise the general level of 
interest and concern. IT support personnel and decision makers may now have a comprehensive 
list of assets and vulnerabilities associated with those assets where none existed before. Decision 
makers now have an improved basis for implementing controls, justifying those controls which 
may prove inconvenient or expensive, and continuing the search for more effective controls should 
the need arise. Finally, IARM is a continuous, non-static process that can be applied by users, IT 
support personnel and decision makers alike, giving the whole chain of command the opportunity 
to personally make a positive contribution to DON's computer network defense performance and 





1. Identify Vulnerabilities 
2. Assess Vulnerabilities 
3. Make Risk Decisions 
4. Implement Controls 
5. Supervise 
Let's talk about the time-critical IARM process. This is IARM on the most 
basic level, and is used during execution of ops/training or short-fused 
planning. Most of you probably use it instinctively without recognizing it as a 
formal process. However, the more deliberate and in-depth IARM you have 
done, the more systematic and thorough your time-critical IARM will become. 
1. Visualize the expected flow of events and identify any conditions which 
might result in data or information loss or compromise, hardware damage or 
degraded system performance. If some prior planning has been done, focus on 
changes in the operation/activity from the original plan. 
2. Determine which of the identified vulnerabilities present the greatest risk, 
considering the potential outcomes and their probability. 
3. Determine what controls can be implemented to counter the highest-risk 
vulnerabilities and what course of action will best accomplish the 
mission/tasks with an acceptable level of risk. Ensure benefits of the selected 
course of action outweigh the risk. 
4. Implement the controls and the course of action decided on in step three. 
5. Monitor the operation/activities for effectiveness of controls and changes. 
Correct ineffective controls and begin the IARM process again as further 
changes occur. 
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Time-critical IARM Examples 
♦ Encountering a suspicious attachment 
♦ Being asked for info over the phone 
♦ Setting up new user accounts 
♦ Determining a new password 
♦ Setting privileges on accounts 
♦ Adding services to a network 
♦ Temporary storage of data of info 
Here are some examples of where time-critical IARM could be used. 
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Class Exercise 
Time-critical ORM Demonstration 
Let's try this time-critical IARM process together. Here's the scenario: 
You can use one of the examples from the previous slide 
(Turn off projector, hand out example scenario and guide class through 5 steps, 
writing their responses on the board.) 
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Active Computer Network Defense: 
Both Developers and Operators are Critical Players 
Recover & Revise 
Monitoring - 
. Ongoing ' 
Vulnerability 
:ÄssKsrnehtj! Vulnerabilities 
This slide is from SPAWAR for the NMCI concept of operations for security. 
Notice how it resemble some of the aspects of IARM. 
Note: IARM assumes more of a systems approach and can be used at the user 
level all the way up to the senior decision makers. 
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Your Next Intrusion ... 






Our next intrusion mishap is when, not if. The human will fail in one of the 5 areas listed. It is 
leadership's challenge to ensure processes are in place to detect the deviation before it leads to an 







"Life is tough, but it's 
tougher if you're stupid" 
igi.-««^'.*-   .'.   '■v"':-:-."-:.V 
Sergeant John M. 
Stryker, USMC, in 
"The Sands of 
Iwo Jima" 
This quote is illustrative of many attitudes towards IA. Its going to remain a 
difficult task if the folks who interact with our computer networks don't get 
smart. IARM is a means by which we can all get smart and improve overall 
CND in the Navy. 
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IARM is a process... 
not a program! 
It must become an inherent 
way of doing business 
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